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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Webster's definition of the n oun "good" begins: "something that
possesses desirable qualities, promotes success, welfare, or happiness,
or is otherwise beneficial."' Whether government should promote the
good, and in particular whether government should use its powers of
persuasion-its "speech," if you will-to promote contested views of
the good, is the subject of this Article. I will argue that, as a matter of
political theory, government in a liberal democracy not only may pro-
mote contested views of the good, but should do so, as well. Further,
nothing in our constitutional jurisprudence demands otherwise, as-
suming certain conditions are met. In taking these positions, I will be
opposing those scholars who either argue for a caretaker government
or accept government speech only insofar as it establishes the precon-
ditions for citizen autonomy. I will argue, instead, for a thicker "per-
fectionism."' That is, I will defend government advancement of spe-
cific, perhaps contested, conceptions of the good. Moreover, I will be
opposing many constitutional theorists who seek to hold government
to certain open forum baselines, especially when government places
conditions on funded private speech. Instead, if such funding condi-
tions raise no concerns of monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism on a
case by case basis, then the conditions are constitutional.
I. INTRODUCTION
Government regulation of private speech is subject to a strict
set of constitutional rules, developed in fits and starts by the Supreme
Court. But the government's own speech, and the government's
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. Yale University, 1982; J.D. Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1986. Thanks to workshop participants at Fordham, Cornell, and Temple for
helpful comments and questions. I have learned much from conversations with many people
about this project. Thanks in particular to these friends and colleagues who offered comments on
earlier drafts: Jesse Choper, Chris Eisgruber, Martin Flaherty, Steve Gilles, Theresa Glennon,
Kiki Jamieson, Andy Koppelman, Anne Kornhauser, Larry Lessig, Linda McClain, John Nagle,
Mark Patterson, David Post, Steve Shiffrin, Frank Snyder, Mel Wulf, and Ben Zipursky.
Finally, I am grateful to the Fordham University School of Law for summer research funding.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 978 (1993).
2. Jeremy Waldron defines perfectionism as "the view that legislators and officials may
consider what is good and valuable in life and what is ignoble and depraved when drafting the
laws and setting the framework for social and personal relationships." Jeremy Waldron, Auton-
omy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1989); see
also STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 8 (1998) ("Perfectionism is
committed to the general thesis that political authorities should take an active role in creating
and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead valuable and worth-
while lives.'). The thick perfectionism I urge, however, is limited to governmental persuasion. I
do not take the further step and argue for governmental coercion to achieve perfectionist ends.
But see id. at 79.
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attachment of speech conditions to its funding,3 have been relatively
unexplored areas for the Court. Scholars writing about government
speech have struggled to apply concerns developed for cases involving
the regulation of private speech-specifically, concerns about the
robustness of public discourse and about individual autonomy-to
cases involving government speech. A fundamental paradox, though,
hinders these efforts. As Robert Post has explained, "the state is
prohibited from imposing any particular conception of collective iden-
tity when it regulates public discourse, but the state must perforce ex-
emplify a particular conception of collective identity when it acts on its
own account."' Doctrine covering the regulation of private speech is
constantly attentive to government imposition of favored conceptions
of the good. When government either speaks itself or attaches speech
conditions to its funding, however, it necessarily advances such a
favored conception. We cannot apply basic free speech doctrine to
government speech without jeopardizing the very possibility of such
speech. But if we are to scrap the basic doctrine, and its attention to
viewpoint pluralism and autonomy, then we open the door to govern-
ment's capturing through speech the minds on which it may not im-
pose more direct limitations.
Many scholars writing about government speech, either as a
matter of constitutional law or political theory, object to governmental
persuasion to advance contested conceptions of the good. For example,
consider legislation conditioning funds for health clinics on their advo-
cacy of abstinence to teens. Or consider the federal government en-
gaging in a public relations campaign to convince parents to send their
children to private school. For many scholars, governmental advocacy
of these sorts of parochial viewpoints, when the matters are clearly
ones of great contemporary social contest, is either unconstitutional as
a matter of first amendment theory (on the ground that the speech is
viewpoint-based, rather than merely the expression of a social consen-
sus) or improper as a matter of liberal democratic theory (on the
ground that at most government should provide the opportunity for
citizens to speak, but should not wield its heavy hand on contested
social matters). Indeed, the two cases I discuss most often in this
3. I will use the phrase "government speech" to refer to both the government's own speech
and the government's funding of speech, which sometimes appears as the government's own
speech and sometimes as the speech of private persons. At times, though, I will specifically
address one of these referents rather than both as a unit. I will also discuss the trans-
parency/opacity problem, or what I refer to as the ventriloquism problem, i.e., the problem of a
message appearing to be that of a private person when it is best understood as that of the
government. See infra Part HI.C.
4. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 183 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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Article-Rust v. Sullivan5 and NEA v. Finley--have become lightning
rods for many scholars precisely because they involve government
using its power (through setting speech conditions on federal funding
programs) to influence expression regarding hotly contested social
matters. In Rust, the Reagan Administration promulgated regula-
tions forbidding doctors receiving federal family planning funds from
either discussing abortion with their patients or referring those pa-
tients to abortion providers. In Finley, Congress amended the
national arts funding statute to make adherence to standards of de-
cency a factor in determining grants. The scholars in this area, for the
most part, deem these governmental acts unconstitutional.' This
position tracks the position of the "thin perfectionist' political theo-
rists, who would draw the line at seed money for speech opportunity.8
All of this is wrong, and this Article attempts to show why.
There are great virtues to government speech, even controversial,
viewpoint-based speech, and I reject the theoretical case for either ex-
tremely limited government, government that is neutral as to the
good, or government that is thinly perfectionist. Thick perfectionism'
is both defensible and desirable. Furthermore, it is wrong to read our
robust first amendment jurisprudence as extending in any deep way to
government speech. Except for specific instances of government
speech that we can see as raising concerns of either monopoly, coer-
cion, or ventriloquism, the Constitution imposes no hurdle to govern-
ment speech, even speech that backs a specific viewpoint in a matter
of current social contest. For those whose intuitions tell them other-
wise, as a matter either of theory or of constitutional law, flip the two
5. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
6. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
7. See, e.g., OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 45-48 (1996) [hereinafter FISS,
IRONY]; OWEN M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 107 (1996) [hereinafter FISS, DIVIDED]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 115, 231 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY]; CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 312 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL]; David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 743 (1992); Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amend-
ment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Under-
inclusion, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 29, 67; Post, supra note 4, at 173-74; Martin H. Redish & Daryl I.
Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 576, 580 (1996).
8. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and
Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1996); Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and
Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998); Waldron, supra note 2. For a discussion of Raz as a thin rather than
thick perfectionist, see infra Part II.C.3.
9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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hypotheticals from above. Should it be improper as a matter of politi-
cal theory, or unconstitutional, for government to condition the fund-
ing of health clinics on their advocating condom usage by teens?
Should it be improper as a matter of political theory, or unconstitu-
tional, for the federal government to spend money trying to persuade
parents to send their kids to public school? Issues such as these should
be fought in the political arena, and cannot be resolved by a rule of
restraint on government persuasion as a matter of either political
theory or constitutional law.
Part II examines the theoretical debate, making the case for
thick perfectionism through government persuasion. Government
may, and should, use its speech powers to advance specific conceptions
of the good, even if those conceptions are contested, controversial, or
seen as favoring a particular viewpoint. Part 11.A situates this claim
within the multiple repositories of power framework I have set forth in
other writing."0 If we sharply constrain government's regulatory
power by dissenters' rights to advance their own conceptions of the
good, then government speech can serve as one voice among many,
seeking to assert the power of the center even as it respects the rights
of the dissenters. Part II.B lays out the virtues of government speech,
and carves out an exception for government religious speech. Part
II.C describes and rebuts three principal attacks on government
speech. There, I reject the extension of Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu-
cation" to government speech generally; I show how political liber-
alism's conception of neutrality cannot withstand close scrutiny; and I
respond to those who advocate a thin perfectionism, i.e., who contend
that government should provide seed money for citizen speech oppor-
tunity, but should not itself advance contested conceptions of the good.
Having made the general theoretical case for government
speech, and more specifically for thick rather than thin perfectionism,
I turn in Part III to specific vices of government speech that might
arise in particular cases, and explore these concerns as a matter of
constitutional law. Thus, Part III.A investigates the problem of gov-
ernment speech that monopolizes discourse in a given speech market.
Here, two independent problems might arise: the speech might jeop-
10. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611
(1993) [hereinafter Greene, Political Balance]; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era
of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible
Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293 (1996) [hereinafter Greene, Irreducible]; Abner S.
Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Greene, Kiryas Joel].
11. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Edue., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The extension would require tax-
payer opt-out rights from government speech with which individuals disagree.
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ardize the knowing exercise of citizen autonomy, and the speech might
skew public discourse by advancing a controversial viewpoint. Gov-
ernment speech that monopolizes a speech market should be deemed
unconstitutional for both of these reasons, but otherwise it should be
considered constitutional, even if viewpoint-based. Part lII.B takes up
the concern that government speech might be coercive, i.e., that it
might undercut the voluntariness aspect of citizen autonomy. Here, I
agree in theory that coercive government speech would be unconstitu-
tional, but explain why it is unlikely that this will be much of a prob-
lem in practice. Part IH.C discusses the ventriloquism problem, that
is, the problem of government's failure to disclose either that it is the
speaker or that it has placed conditions on the funding of private
speech. It is less clear whether an instance of government speech
should be invalidated solely because of ventriloquism, though the
existence of ventriloquism should matter in analyzing the constitu-
tionality of the government speech in question. In sum, I suggest that
we analyze the validity of specific acts of government speech according
to whether sufficient monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism concerns
have been raised.
Perhaps the main issue that has occupied the attention of con-
stitutional law scholars writing in this area is what I call the forum-
change problem. If a speech forum has been generally understood as
open-that is, open to all viewpoints and subject to time, place, and
manner regulations only-may the government shift such a forum to a
limited one, definable by viewpoint or subject matter? The scholars
have converged on a principle that would sharply limit government's
power to convert open forums to limited ones. I analyze these argu-
ments in some detail in Part IV, concluding that they grant too quick
deference to established open forum practice. Other, stronger argu-
ments for maintaining the open character of forums exist, however, by
reference to Court doctrine regarding physical forums (streets and
parks) that are treated as open. Even this analogy, I conclude, fails
properly to restrict government from changing the character of funded
speech from open to limited. I offer a conclusion in Part V.
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II. THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
A. The Case for Government Speech Within the Multiple
Repositories of Power Framework
The case for thick perfectionism' works in a liberal democracy
only as part of the broader case for divided power, or for what I have
called "multiple repositories of power."13 The multiple repositories of
power theory of our Constitution rests on the view that fractured sov-
ereignty both wards off certain risks and has its own virtues. Struc-
turally, power is disaggregated through separation of powers (includ-
ing judicial review) and federalism. Constitutional rights-both those
of political process (speech, press, petition, voting) and autonomy
(religion, family, substantive due process)-serve to ensure that sov-
ereignty remains ultimately in the citizens and not their delegates.
This combination of structure and rights prevents the concentration of
power that is the harbinger of despotism. In addition to providing this
insurance function, the structure/rights combination helps foster
separate sources of norms, of value, of notions of the good. If power is
properly fractured in this way, then government speech can be part of
a robust debate in which the government must compete with other
speakers. If power is not properly placed in multiple hands-for ex-
ample, if dominant religions insist on using the legislative process to
establish the hegemony of their faith, or if the points of view of dissi-
dent speakers are squelched-then the case for thick perfectionism
would weaken.
The argument in this Article for government speech, thus,
complements arguments I have made elsewhere for rights of religious
minorities against the government.' I have made that case in three
ways: the establishment clause should be construed to prevent domi-
nant religions from passing legislation through predominant, ex-
pressly religious arguments; the free exercise clause should be read to
provide a system of prima facie exemptions to religions whose prac-
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. See sources cited supra note 10.
14. See generally Greene, Political Balance, supra note 10; Abner S. Greene, Is Religion
Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535 [hereinafter Greene, Rejoinder];
Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994) (book review) [hereinafter
Greene, Uncommon Ground]; Greene, Irreducible, supra note 10; Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note
10; Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional, and Why They're Not, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, Vouchers]; Abner S. Greene, The
Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Stephen M.
Feldman ed., forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Greene, Incommensurability].
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tices are burdened by nondiscriminatory, general legislation; and
nothing in the establishment clause (or any other clause) should be
construed to prevent legislatures from accommodating minority relig-
ions by granting them various forms of special relief through law.
Each of these arguments advanced the case for decentralized power,
but I made clear that the multiple repositories of power scheme does
not privilege decentralized power. "[O]ur constitution no more coun-
tenances the foundationalism of fractured power than it does the
foundationalism of centralized power."" Thus, at the end of two prior
articles, after advancing the case for fractured power, I added short
sections on government speech, explaining that through its powers of
persuasion, government may seek to achieve various ends it may not
seek to achieve through regulation."5 This Article, then, is the playing
out of those prior suggestions.
B. The Virtues of Government Speech
It is hard to imagine government functioning without commu-
nicating. But claiming government speech is a necessity is not the
same as defending its virtues. In addition to the truism that govern-
ment officials must speak to govern, in the most basic sense of issuing
laws and orders, there are four ways in which government speech can
be seen, more affirmatively, as a good."
First, government communication can assist the execution of
law through explaining and supporting the laws that are enacted. 8
Second, and more controversially, the government can act to enhance
public debate. It can establish opportunities for citizen speech by
establishing either funding forums or physical forums that are open to
all speakers, as in the Hyde Park corner soapboxes in London. In-
deed, for some scholars, this is the primary justification for govern-
ment speech, and government speech that does other than establish
the preconditions for citizen participation is deemed less defensible. 9
15. Greene, Irreducible, supra note 10, at 309.
16. See id. at 309-10; Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note 10, at 83-86.
17. For various statements supporting government persuasion on conceptions of the good,
see THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 5, 158-60, 163 (1993); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 142-
43, 149-51 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 1974) (1859); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND
NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 6-7 (1997); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 14, 17, 34, 37, 56 (1997); WALL, supra note 2, at 6 n.8, 79, 201; Joseph Raz,
Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1230-31 (1989).
18. See Cole, supra note 7, at 681, 702; Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 560-61; Steven
Sbiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980).
19. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 33-35 (1969); STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 187 (1995); MILL, supra
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Owen Fiss has emerged as the strongest advocate of this position.
Free speech is primarily justified as enhancing public debate; the pur-
pose of the liberty is "to make certain that the people are aware of all
the issues before them and the arguments on both sides of these is-
sues." Fiss even goes so far as to suggest that "[t]he judiciary... in
the worst of all possible worlds ... might have to mandate a freeze or
even an increase in levels of spending to protect First Amendment
values."'"
Third, various forms of speech, including art and information,
might be considered a kind of public good, the production of which
would lag if left to the private sector.' The benefits from much speech
outstrip the ability of the producers of speech to internalize them. The
government can provide incentives for speech and can disseminate the
results of such incentives in a way that solves this collective action
problem. The copyright laws are but one example of this. More gen-
erally, anti-perfectionism "would lead not merely to a political stand-
off from support for valuable conceptions of the good. It would under-
mine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of ourculture.' '
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, government speech of-
ten makes a distinctive contribution to public debate."' If the gov-
ernment's point of view were simply corroborative of private points of
view, the affirmative argument for government speech would weaken
as the concerns about government power rise. There are three rea-
sons, though, to believe that government speech will be distinctive.
First, preferences expressed through voting are often different from
those expressed through consumption or other forms of nonpolitical
behavior. Someone might smoke cigarettes but support the Surgeon
General's warnings; someone else might be careless about discarding
waste but support government efforts to clean up the environment,
through both regulation and public service announcements. In other
note 17, at 168-83; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 15, 34, 112 (1983); see also Cole, supra note 7, at 681, 703;
Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 560-62. See generally SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7.
20. FIss, DIVIDED, supra note 7, at 5; see also id. at 19, 37-38, 101.
21. Id. at 106.
22. See id. at 98; FISS, IRONY, supra note 7, at 27, 48; HOLMES, supra note 19, at 37, 186;
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 226-27.
23. RAZ, supra note 8, at 162.
24. One has to be a bit careful about what "distinctive" means here. My point is that the
government may be better situated than citizens in their private capacity (either as individuals
or in groups) to advance certain arguments or foster certain conceptions of the good. My point is
not that government officials have legitimate interests separate from those of the citizens they
represent. For a general theoretical argument backing the "service conception of the function of
authorities," see id. at 47-56; see also Raz, supra note 17, at 1231.
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words, it is possible, through government, to bind ourselves to a notion
of the good from which we fear we will stray in our private lives.'
Second, government may use its powers of persuasion to alter
social norms, when individuals acting without governmental involve-
ment would not be able to do so on their own or in smaller groups.
Even though it might be generally preferable for people to alter social
norms without governmental intervention, "sometimes it is too costly
for individuals to create or join [norm communities], and sometimes
the generally held norm is too damaging to human well-being."'
Moreover, people in their private capacities don't just "have" prefer-
ences to which government should respond. People's desires are
deeply embedded in various structures, both private and public. Since
preferences are, in this way, endogenous to rather than exogenous
from context, 7 government is not improperly reaching across some
sacrosanct public-private boundary when it uses its persuasive powers
to alter norms (for example, regarding race, sexual preference, ciga-
rette smoking, or overeating) and thereby modify preferences.
Third, the government's distinctive contribution to public de-
bate will often involve advocacy of shared values, of the virtues of the
unum over the e pluribus, of integration over multi-culturalism. Al-
though the government might also, at times, advocate more contro-
versial, parochial perspectives, the centralizing message of govern-
ment speech is often an important quality. As discussed above, our
constitutionalism is based in multiple repositories of power; through
both structure and rights, power is fractured, not concentrated. So
long as speech, press, and religion rights are vigorously protected, we
can assume that advocacy of various cultural perspectives will be
advanced, and that the e pluribus will flourish. Given this assurance,
the government has an important role to play in competing for the
allegiance of its citizens, to attempt to persuade them to adopt a
shared, American identity rather than a separate identity based in a
sub-community.'
25. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
76 (1979); HOLMES, supra note 19, at 179; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 245-46;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 20-24, 44-45.
26. SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 55.
27. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY, at vii, 22
(1983); RAZ, supra note 8, at 140-42; SHER, supra note 17, at 80; SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 14,
17, 34, 38, 43, 49, 54-55; Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUDIES 661,
662-63 & n.1 (1998); Raz, supra note 17, at 1235.
28. See Greene, Irreducible, supra note 10, at 309; see also Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note
10, at 85-86 ("Government can help homogenous nomic communities thrive while simultaneously
encouraging citizens-sometimes the same citizens who comprise those homogenous nomic
communities-to find common ground.').
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Government speech virtues obtain even when government is
advancing contested viewpoints. For example, assume that a city
council decides, after debate, to spend money educating teens about
condom usage to prevent sexually transmitted diseases.' Assume fur-
ther that there is a substantial minority-both on the council and
among the citizenry-that opposes this position. Some of the minority
would prefer to spend the money educating teens about abstinence.
Others would prefer to offer teens an alternative between condom
usage and abstinence. Still others would prefer not to spend any tax
dollars in this area. Putting aside which view is correct, spending the
money to advance a contested viewpoint (be it condom usage or absti-
nence) is often a good thing. First of all, if an elected majority believes
that one message or the other is true, or good, then perhaps we could
say it has a duty to express what it believes to be true or good. Better
that than to be silent. This is an extension of an argument about in-
dividual responsibility: if I believe X to be true or good, and I have a
responsibility to another person on the subject, then arguing for X
(when Y is a competing position) might be considered morally obliga-
tory, and silence would be an error. The same could be considered
true of government's moral obligation to its citizens. Moreover, gov-
ernment persuasion on a contested matter plays an important role in
countering private power. As one locus of power in society, govern-
ment can check agglomerations of private power, just as checks on
government ensure that it be only one voice among many. Addition-
ally, even in a contested arena government speech can help foster
debate, fleshing out views, and leading toward a more educated citi-
zenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.
Before turning to the principal arguments against this more
robust role for government speech, I offer a few caveats to the fore-
going. First: I am not in this Article arguing for any specific concep-
tion of the good that government should advance. Rather, I am mak-
ing the general case for a thicker perfectionism."
Second: My support for government speech even in areas of
great social turmoil-that is, my support for government using its
29. Or assume they set up a program to fund private organizations, with a condition that
the organizations educate about condom usage.
30. For more specific conceptions, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS,
VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 173-76 (1991) (describing a liberal perfectionist
agenda); DAVID JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE AND RECONSTRUcTION
97 (1994) (arguing government should support "some degree of ability to appraise or reappraise
one's projects and values critically') (emphasis omitted); WALL, supra note 2, at 2 n.3 (declaring
liberal perfectionism holds that "personal autonomy is a central component of human flour-
ishing'); id. at 208-33; McClain, supra note 8, at 36 (describing a feminist perfectionist agenda);
id. at 39 (describing a civic republican perfectionist agenda).
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powers of persuasion even to advance a contested viewpoint-is in
sharp contrast with my views regarding government support for re-
ligion. This position requires an argument that religion is distinctive,
for constitutional purposes. I have made that argument in detail
elsewhere," and will only summarize it here. When dominant relig-
ions advance predominantly religious arguments in the legislative
process, they effectively disenfranchise nonbelievers from meaningful
participation in that process. Religious arguments rely, ultimately, on
reference to an extra-human source of normative authority, and non-
believers have not engaged in the leap of faith necessary to appreciate
the force of that authority. Thus, the establishment clause of the
United States Constitution should be (and has been) construed to in-
validate such legislation." More generally, the establishment clause
should be construed to bar dominant religions from using law to ad-
vance their religious missions. But reliance on controversial nonre-
ligious arguments, either as part of the legislative process or to sup-
port government speech in an area of social contest, does not
disenfranchise those on the other side in the way that religious argu-
mentation does. The Constitution forbids the establishment of relig-
ion, but it does not-forbid the establishment of secular conceptions of
the good, at least if done through persuasive and not coercive means.
C. The Arguments Against Government Speech
1. Abood-Writ-Large
The broadest attack on government speech asserts that the
proper role of government is to provide for defense, police, and fire
protection, to build roads and bridges, and to stay out of the advance-
ment of the good if at all possible. Such a libertarian argument rejects
even thin perfectionism. That is, it rejects the idea that government
should provide for the preconditions of living a good life, whatever that
31. For more information about this argument, see generally Greene, Incommensurability,
supra note 14; Greene, Irreducible, supra note 10; Greene, Political Balance, supra note 10;
Greene, Rejoinder, supra note 14; Greene, Uncommon Ground, supra note 14; Greene, Vouchers,
supra note 14.
32. The free exercise clause should be construed as a counterweight to the Establishment
Clause, creating prima facie exemptions for those burdened by nondiscriminatory, general
legislation in their religious practice. See Greene, Political Balance, supra note 10, at 1633-40.
But just as there is no constitutional provision barring the establishment of secular conceptions
of the good, neither should we understand there to be a constitutional provision requiring prima
facie exemptions for those burdened by nondiscriminatory, general legislation in their secular
lives. See id. at 1640-43.
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good life is, through general funding of schools, museums, libraries,
art, etc.
This broad anti-perfectionist attack has found an ally in a line
of Supreme Court cases that is threatening to become even more im-
portant than it now is. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the
Court ruled that contributions compelled by law from nonunion mem-
bers violated the first amendment when used for political and ideo-
logical purposes rather than for collective bargaining.' The Abood
principle is a close cousin of the extreme anti-perfectionist brand of
liberal argument. The natural extension of the Abood principle would
grant all taxpayers a right not to contribute to government speech
with which they disagree. Indeed, a recent decision of the Seventh
Circuit, which the Supreme Court will review this term, extended
Abood to mandatory student fees at public universities. Many univer-
sities collect such fees and authorize their student governments to
spend the money in ways both nonideological (e.g., athletics, music,
drama) and ideological (e.g., organizations dealing with issues of the
environment, poverty, gender). Some students at the University of
Wisconsin sued, alleging that their first amendment rights were vio-
lated when the mandatory fees were spent to support ideological ends
with which they disagreed. The Court of Appeals in Southworth v.
Grebe agreed that Abood applied here.' A Supreme Court affirmance
would represent a dramatic step toward concretizing anti-perfection-
ism into constitutional law.
There are three ways to respond to Abood and its possible ex-
tension to a broad, invasive taxpayer right not to fund government
speech with which one disagrees.' First, one could accept Abood but
limit it, distinguishing both cases such as Southworth and taxpayer
rights more generally. Thus, one could fend off Abood-writ-large by
citing administrative concerns; while it is possible to issue pro rata
refunds of the dues of nonunion members, it would be impossible (i.e.,
prohibitively costly) to do the same for taxpayer refunds. Or consider
the situation when the taxes or dues in question are part of a small
subset of governance, and they involve the livelihood of those as-
sessed. Here, the dissenters can properly argue that although the cost
of citizenship generally must include disfavored government speech,
33. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
34. See Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 723-32, reh'g denied, 157 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. granted sub nom., Board of Regents v. Southworth, 119 S. Ct. 1332 (1999).
35. Even with this extension, the Court would have to leave open government speech to
promulgate laws and issue orders. See YUDOF, supra note 19, at 204-07; Shiffrin, supra note 18,
at 588-93. Other government speech-even that used to drum up support for laws and regu-
lations-would be eliminated in a world in which Abood were writ large.
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the cost of one's occupation should not include compelled contributions
toward such speech.
Another argument for limiting Abood might be stronger still.
In Abood and Keller,'6 the union and the state bar had certain ideologi-
cal interests that their funding choices reflected. In Southworth, to
the contrary, the student government did not have specific ideological
interests, but rather funded an array of private groups. Thus, Judge
Wood, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's refusal to reconsider the
panel decision en banc, correctly characterized the pot of money cre-
ated by mandatory student activities fees as creating a viewpoint-neu-
tral (and one might add subject matter neutral) forum." We can there-
fore analogize to other public forums funded by many people-a public
park, a municipal auditorium, a public library, a public museum. 8
Many people who have to pay money to support these forums doubt-
less disagree with many messages being disseminated in these fo-
rums, but it is a deep misunderstanding of the free speech right (and
the freedom of association implied right) to require opt-outs in these
settings. It is the open forum that is funded; many voices are then
heard in the forum, none specifically attributable to any one citizen or
citizens, none specifically fostered by any one citizen or citizens.
A helpful analogy here is the line of establishment clause cases
upholding government funding that runs to religious institutions so
long as the subject matter of the funding is secular and so long as the
recipients are sufficiently general, i.e., secular and religious alike." It
is true that Justice O'Connor, in her Rosenberger concurrence, held
open the possibility of an opt-out for students who disagree with cer-
tain funded speech activities."0 But one should not let that undercut
the larger point of the Court's obsession with "generality": If a funding
program is sufficiently general, it cannot be said that the state is en-
36. 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (applying Abood to mandatory state bar dues).
37. As she put succinctly: 'It is the same as if they simply built a large auditorium and held
it open for everyone." Southworth, 157 F.3d at 1129 (Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc).
38. Not to mention that student tuition pays for lots of ideological speech-salaries of fac-
ulty members who advance ideological positions, library and museum acquisitions, etc.
39. See generally Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding as part
of a general state-compelled student activities fund funding of a religious newspaper); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding as part of a general program of state
aid to disabled students funding of sign-language interpreter used by student in private religious
school); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding as
part of a general program of aid to disabled students state funding of a blind person studying at
a private religious college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state deduction from
income tax for educational expenses at both secular and religious schools).
40. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 851-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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dorsing any of the recipients' messages, religious or otherwise. Simi-
larly (and despite Justice O'Connor's musings), it cannot be said that
the citizens who make up the state (whose funds become the state's
funds that go to the various recipients) are endorsing any of the re-
cipients' messages. There is no reason to believe this conclusion is any
different in a non-establishment clause case.
The main problem with this method of limiting Abood is that if
the forum were truly an open one-subject to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions but without the possibility of any content-
based access or funding determinations-it would be easier to invoke
the cases involving truly "general" access. In Southworth, it is not
clear what the student government's criteria are for selecting funding
recipients; it doesn't appear that one can assert that the criteria are
just like reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Similarly,
when government uses taxpayer funds to support ideological speech
(whether its own or by funding private speakers), it does not operate
through strict open forum rules of content neutrality. It remains true,
though, that general taxpayer funds, just as student activities fees at
most universities, are used for a wide array of speech purposes.
Therefore, one could avoid the precise complaint raised in Abood and
Keller-that a single recipient (the union; the state bar) was using the
funds to advance its own fairly limited set of causes.
The other two responses to Abood undercut that precedent it-
self, and the theory of limited government that lies behind it. First,
even if we accept the Court's general compelled speech jurisprudence
and its cases on rights of political association, Abood does not neces-
sarily follow. Beginning with West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,4 the Court sometimes has invalidated state actions com-
pelling speech under a "right not to speak" doctrine, and sometimes
has upheld such state actions in the face of such a doctrine."2 If the
government commands that citizens speak or foster a particular mes-
sage, the statute will be invalidated (as applied, not on its face).4
41. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a public school cannot require its students to pledge
allegiance to the flag).
42. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding the Agri-
culture Marketing Agreement Acts advertising regulations); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding the Cable Television Consumer Protection
Act's requirement that cable television systems provide public stations); PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a state's constitutional protection of speech in
private shopping centers); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the FCC's
fairness doctrine).
43. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-17 (1977) (striking down compelled "Live
Free or Die" motto on state license plates); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (invalidating compelled
pledge of allegiance in public school).
20001
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
Similarly, if a statute gives some citizens a right to speak in the publi-
cation of another citizen, and if this right is triggered by specific
speech content, that statute will be invalid (these were done facially)."
None of these cases turned on whether a listener/viewer of the speech
would be at a high risk of attributing the compelled speech to the
speaker. The one case that did turn on that fact was Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc." There, a state statute
had been construed to give a gay and lesbian group the right to march
in a privately sponsored St. Patrick's Day parade. The Court accepted
the parade organizers' argument that the gay and lesbian message
might be falsely attributed to the parade organizers, and that the gay
and lesbian message would detract from the message that the organ-
izers wished to send.
None of these lines of precedent supports Abood or any of its
extensions. In Abood-type cases, the government does not compel citi-
zens to speak or foster any particular message (by displaying a sign on
their property, for example); it does not grant some citizens a right to
speak in or on the property of another citizen, triggered by specific
speech content; and there is no reasonable chance that people will at-
tribute speech to a particular person because such speech was paid for
in minuscule part by her taxes or dues or fees." As a tax/dues/fees
payer, a person remains free to speak all she wants or not at all.
Abood also purported to rely on the right of political associa-
tion, and in particular the political patronage cases. The Court has
held that, except for those officials in policymaking positions, public
employees may not be hired and fired on the basis of their political
association; in other words, political patronage has its constitutional
limits."1 Abood cited this line of patronage cases without careful
analysis." The patronage cases and the Abood problem are quite
44. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating
statute that gave public interest group right to publish in utility's billing envelope after group
objected to specific company messages); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(striking down statute that gave right of reply to political candidates whose records had been
attacked in that very media outlet).
45. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
46. This is especially true once we consider that others will know the taxes/dues/fees are
mandatory, and therefore know that the payers had no choice but to pay. It is unreasonable to
assume anything about the beliefs/ideologies of the payers in such circumstances. See Abner S.
Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 473-75 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
48. The Court wrote:
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the [Constitution].
Equally clear is the proposition that a government may not require an individual to
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different. The former involve use of political affiliation to condition
public employment; the latter involves taking a portion of one's
tax/dues/fees dollar and spending it on ideological causes with which
one disagrees. The former use one's identification as a member of a
political party to deprive one of a job to which she would be otherwise
entitled; the latter imposes no such direct and particularized harm. In
the political patronage setting, either one renounces one's political
affiliation or one loses the government job. In the Abood setting, one
can vigorously advocate one's political positions, and lose only money
exacted for union dues. It is hard to see how this constitutes com-
pelled association.
The other way to undercut Abood is to reject its strictly-neutral
conception of liberal democracy. Abood appears based on a mistake
about what sort of legitimacy argument is needed to overcome gov-
ernmental coercion. If the government forbids (or requires) specific
conduct, it should have a justification based in a theory of how that
specific conduct is harmful (or good) and an explanation for why public
sanctions are needed. The justification for taxation-a type of coer-
cion-should sound in general terms. In other words, the government
must be able to explain why it is, generally, a legitimate form of
authority with power to compel taxation. But the justification for any
particular use of tax dollars should not have to overcome these stricter
hurdles of legitimacy, but rather merely those of policy. Abood treats
specific uses of compelled payments as if they were specific require-
ments or prohibitions on behavior, rather than asking whether the
tax/dues/fees assessment is generally legitimate and leaving to the
policy arena the debate over the use of funds.
Instead of the extreme anti-perfectionism that Abood supports,
we should endorse a more limited conception of neutrality, under
which government let individuals develop their own conceptions of the
good life and live such conceptions accordingly, subject to some sort of
clear harm principle. Here, the government may advance particular
conceptions of the good and encourage people to follow such con-
relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public em-
ployment. The appellants argue that they fall within the protection of these cases be-
cause they have been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather from refusing
to associate. They specifically argue that they may constitutionally prevent the Union's
spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to
express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative. We
have concluded that this argument is a meritorious one .... [A]t the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that
in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-35 (1976) (citations omitted).
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ceptions, so long as dissent is left open and the government's concep-
tions are just some of many advanced. Under this thicker theory of
liberal democracy, one must accept that on some legislative battles
one will be in the minority, and that the result of losing in a fair and
open democratic process will be not only having to live under un-
wanted laws but also having to listen to (and help fund) speech with
which one disagrees, in this case by the government. Abood has made
possible cases such as Southworth and has made plausible arguments
that would close down all publicly funded speech forums, on the
ground that objecting taxpayers have a right not to fund speech with
which they disagree in any setting. Abood is an unwarranted exten-
sion of both the compelled speech and political association cases; it
exhibits a cramped view of the power of government to advance theo-
ries of the good through persuasion; it does not fit with any of our
practices. It should be dispensed with."
2. The Lure of "Neutrality"
The Abood-writ-large argument generally comes from the po-
litical right. From the political left comes a different type of argument
against a thicker perfectionism. Rawls, Dworkin, and others have
advanced various theories of liberal neutrality, and with it various
arguments about why government should not enter contests about the
good. The liberal way of treating citizens as equals, says Dworkin,"supposes that government must be neutral on what might be called
the question of the good life."' The contrasting political view, says
Dworkin, supposes that "government cannot be neutral on that ques-
tion, because it cannot treat its citizens as equal human beings with-
out a theory of what human beings ought to be."1 Bruce Ackerman
defines neutrality in this way: "No reason is a good reason if it re-
quires the power holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the good is
better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that,
regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to
one or more of his fellow citizens."52 As David Johnston puts it, liber-
alism presupposes the "assumption of reasonable value pluralism."'
According to George Sher, the broadest theory of neutralism rules out
49. For arguments rejecting sgmething like the Abood principle, see RAZ, supra note 8, at
418; WALL, supra note 2, at 199-200. For an argument supporting something like the Abood
principle, see Waldron, supra note 2, at 1139-40.
50. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985).
51. Id.
52. ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 11; see also id. at 43.
53. JOHNSTON, supra note 30, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
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various methods of promoting the good, including not only forces and
threats, but also rewards and nonrational manipulation through the
"attitudes and actions of those whom [one] admires and wishes to
imitate."'
The most influential advocate of governmental neutrality to-
ward conceptions of the good has been John Rawls.' Although in A
Theory of Justice' he suggested the possibility of a comprehensive
liberalism-all citizens (at least hypothetically) accepting certain basic
principles about equality-in Political Liberalism57 he set out to solve
the problem of how to justify governmental power in societies in which
people have fundamentally different notions of the good. In such a
society, in which common ground is hard to find, we can operate only
through an "overlapping consensus." 8 In other words, citizens with
differing comprehensive views of the good can endorse a shared politi-
cal conception of justice, each from the point of view of his or her own
conception of the good, but without advancing any of those conceptions
as foundational for the society. In sum, for Rawls, it is impermissibly
sectarian to advance contested conceptions of the good as part of gov-
ernance in a society defined by divisions in what people believe to con-
stitute the good, i.e., in any liberal democracy currently existing."
This type of argument for political liberalism-advanced by
Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, and others-fails. It rests on a concep-
tion of neutrality that purports to be not, itself, a conception of the
good, but rather to be standing outside or above conceptions of the
good. If it rested on a conception that was, itself, just another concep-
tion of the good, then it would not be neutral toward notions of the
good. Rather, it would be (just) another type of comprehensive theory
of the good that would have to compete with other such theories in the
political arena. I share the view of critics who contend that the
higher/outside ground of neutrality cannot be found, and that Rawl-
sian political liberalism is, in fact, another sectarian theory of the
54. SHER, supra note 17, at 36.
55. My discussion of Rawls below draws on Greene, Uncommon Ground, supra note 14.
56. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
57. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
58. Id. at 133-72.
59. As Steven Wall cogently explains, Rawls' strongest argument for such neutrality is from
a conception of democratic toleration. If we appeal to controversial ideas in politics, then the
results will not, for Rawls, "tolerate those who hold opposing philosophical views. It will be
objectionably sectarian." WALL, supra note 2, at 72. Citizens should be disposed to seek "prin-
ciples that others could accept." Id. at 73. They also must accept what Rawls calls the "burdens of
judgment," or what Wall calls being "epistemically charitable," that is, '"eople who maintain
that their controversial views are correct and that others should accept them because they are
correct are being unreasonable in an epistemological sense." Id.
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good.' In the remainder of this Section, I show why the critics are cor-
rect; then suggest that a modified version of political liberalism might
come closer to working; and finally explain that, although I agree lib-
eral neutrality has been exposed as a comprehensive doctrine (what
some call comprehensive liberalism), my general argument for gov-
ernment speech does not reject comprehensive liberalism in the politi-
cal arena. Rather, my argument rejects the contention that compre-
hensive liberalism is required as a matter either of moral theory or of
American constitutional law.
The principal and most stinging critique of Rawlsian political
liberalism is that it cannot defend the high ground that it seeks to es-
tablish. The argument for abstracting from the actual, contested no-
tions of the good that people hold is not a neutral, removed, higher
ground argument; it is itself a (contested) conception of the good. If
Alice believes in some fundamental good, and offers it for acceptance
in the political arena, and Sarah responds by saying that pursuit of
contested conceptions of the good should be left to citizens in their pri-
vate lives, and that politics should be a ground for sharable concep-
tions of justice only (from the point of view of the various conceptions
of the good, i.e., Rawls' overlapping consensus), Sarah cannot win the
argument without explaining why this notion of political agnosticism
is better than Alice's push for good X. But if Sarah is to win that
argument, she must be able to show that political agnosticism is bet-
ter than good X, and that argument must defend, at some level, the
goodness of agnosticism. Another angle on this is to realize that the
type of neutrality for which Rawls argues necessarily benefits those
who already, from the viewpoint of their conceptions of the good, ac-
cept agnosticism about the good in politics, while necessarily harming
those who already, from the viewpoint of their conceptions of the good,
cannot accept such agnosticism.6' As Stanley Fish sums it up in his
brilliant attack on higher-ground moves of neutrality:
IThere are no different or stronger reasons than policy reasons, and . . . the an-
nouncement of a formula (higher-order impartiality, mutual respect, or the judgment of
all mankind) that supposedly outflanks politics, or limits its sphere by establishing a
space free from its incursions, will be nothing more or less than politics-here under-
stood not as a pejorative, but as the name of the activity by which you publicly urge
what you think to be good and true-by another name, the name, but never the reality,
of principle.62
60. See infra notes 62-63.
61. See Greene, Uncommon Ground, supra note 14, at 667-71.
62. Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2297 (1997). As will be clear in a moment, although I share Fish's
general distaste for moves toward a higher ground of neutrality, I disagree with him on the
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Liberalism of any kind isn't neutral; as William Galston puts it, "[1ike
every other political community, it embraces a view of the human good
that favors certain ways of life and tilts against others."'
Political liberalism (or liberal neutrality, I mean these as syno-
nyms) could succeed, but only by acknowledging its lack of neutrality
and correcting the harm done to those whose views of the good cannot
countenance agnosticism in politics. If we acknowledge that keeping
contested views of the good out of politics is intrinsically helpful to
some comprehensive theories of the good and harmful to others, and
adopt such "common ground" rules of politics anyway, then we have
indeed created a politics that is not worthy of the name neutrality.
But perhaps we could adopt common ground rules and simultaneously
recognize that the gag rule we have imposed has harmed citizens dis-
proportionately, cutting to the quick those whose views of the good
require (or at least permit) their admission into the political arena. If
we follow that recognition by creating a system of exit options for such
citizens, then our claim of legitimately binding them to the polity can
stand. We must see sovereignty as permeable; that is, if we restrict
the introduction of certain types of arguments in politics, then we
must create at least a prima facie system of exemptions from law (a
type of exit option) for those whose arguments we have excluded.' In
this way, we can continue our claim of legitimate government (for
excluding someone's voice and binding her by law without exception
cuts to the core of illegitimacy), while establishing a form (though not
Rawls' form) of political liberalism.
I would not, though, exclude from politics all contested concep-
tions of the good. Rather, we should exclude from politics only ex-
pressly religious arguments, and allow secular arguments about the
good to be advanced, whether by individual citizens, legislators, or the
government itself. I have summarized above my argument made in
other places about the need for a gag rule on arguments from religious
faith.' The burden of much of the rest of this Article is to show the
virtues of (nonreligious) government speech and the failings of both
theoretical and constitutional arguments to the contrary.
Finally, the exposure of liberal neutrality as another compre-
hensive doctrine does not mean that we should not accept comprehen-
sive liberalism. As I explained earlier, my argument in this Article is
specific question of religion in politics. See Greene, Incommensurability, supra note 14; Greene,
Political Balance, supra note 10; see also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
63. GALSTON, supra note 30, at 3; see id. at 92; see also SHER, supra note 17, at 80.
64. See generally Greene, Incommensurability, supra note 14; Greene, Political Balance,
supra note 10; Greene, Rejoinder, supra note 14; Greene, Uncommon Ground, supra note 14.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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not that liberal conceptions of the good are wrong, or that they should
not be advanced through politics, or by government speech. The ar-
gument, rather, is that if we are to be liberals, we must be liberals in
the cauldron of politics, and that one set of arguments against gov-
ernment speech-that government may not and should not advance
contested conceptions of the good-cannot stand on the ground of neu-
trality, and is not supported by constitutional doctrine.
3. Thin Perfectionism
Many scholars do not consider themselves anti-perfectionist,
but neither are they comfortable urging government to intervene on
behalf of contested notions of the good. Rather, these "thin" perfec-
tionists urge government to provide the preconditions for citizen
autonomy-or, more generally, for citizens' capacity to advance their
own conceptions of the good-and then to stand back from the fray.
Linda McClain, for example, distinguishes between government facili-
tation of citizen choice--"to foster the capacities for self-government
by measures that do not obviously steer or take sides"--and govern-
ment attempts to persuade or moralize-"to use measures short of
coercion with the intention of steering citizens toward certain values,
choices, and behavior and away from protected though disfavored
values, choices, and behavior."' "[Toleration as respect"--McClain's
term for how government in a liberal democracy should treat its
citizens-
supports governmental persuasion in certain cases, for example, when it furthers the
ends of democratic self-government or promotes public values. The more difficult ques-
tion is whether government should, as [thick] perfectionists urge, engage in the busi-
ness of... steering citizens toward better or more valuable ways of life by such means
as shaping preferences and social norms and encouraging certain choices over others.6 7
McClain's answer to this question is a fairly clear "No." She writes,
for example, that toleration as respect would
favorably distinguish, on the one hand, government acting to further the capacity for
self-government through encouraging reflective decisionmaking and, on the other, gov-
ernment steering in favor of a sectarian orthodoxy or contested view of the good
life.... [Toleration as respect... should be cautious about embracing [thick perfec-
tionism's] call for government evaluating and preferring some lives over others and
seeking to perfect persons' lives by altering their preferences, particularly in light of
such prudential concerns as whose perfectionism will supply the content of govern-
66. McClain, supra note 8, at 23.
67. Id. at 26.
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ment's project and how a deliberative democracy will resolve conflicts over what it
means to live a good, self-governing life.M
Other scholars follow similar tacks.9 Joseph Raz offers what is
commonly thought to be a perfectionist brand of comprehensive liber-
alism. However, at critical moments he steps back from a thicker per-
fectionism, instead resting with a thin perfectionism that allows a
governmental role in creating autonomous citizens, but little more.
He writes:
There is more one can do to help another person have an autonomous life than stand
off and refrain from coercing or manipulating him. There are two further categories of
autonomy-based duties towards another person. One is to help in creating the inner
capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life.. .. The third type of auton-
omy-based duty towards another concerns the creation of an adequate range of options
for him to choose from. 0
He says later, "Autonomy-based duties, in conformity with the harm
principle, require the use of public power to promote the conditions of
autonomy, to secure an adequate range of options for the population."1
It is true that Raz offers the following, which might be thought' to
promote a thicker perfectionism:
[Tihe autonomy principle is a perfectionist principle. Autonomous life is valuable only
if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and relationships. The
autonomy principle permits and even requires governments to create morally valuable
opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones. [This is not inconsistent with the
harm principle, for it] merely restricts the use of coercion. Perfectionist goals need not
be pursued by the use of coercion. A government which subsidizes certain activities,
rewards their pursuit, and advertises their availability encourages those activities
without using coercion.73
And again here:
The conditions of autonomy, it was emphasized before, include the existence of a public
culture which maintains and encourages the cultivation of certain tastes and the un-
dertaking of certain pursuits. A public culture which inculcates respect for the envi-
68. Id. at 41-42; see also id. at 57 ("governmental persuasion should foster, not hinder, the
capacity for self-government'); id. at 75 (toleration as respect "assumes a basic governmental
responsibility to facilitate persons' capacity for self-government'); id. at 97 (toleration as respect
would agree with Dworkin that government may "encourage reflective decisionmaking'); id. at
107 (Rawls' political liberalism, with which McClain sympathizes, "recognizes a proper role for
government in helping to develop the moral powers, or moral capacities of citizens, to prepare
them for self-governing citizenship').
69. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 139, 156; BERLIN, supra note 19, at 33-35; FISS,
DIVIDED, supra note 7, at 5, 19, 37-38, 101, 106; HOLMES, supra note 19, at 187; JOHNSTON,
supra note 30, at 69-70, 77, 97; MILL, supra note 17, at 168-83; SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 19;
YUDOF, supra note 19, at 15, 34, 112; see also Cole, supra note 7, at 681, 703; Redish & Kessler,
supra note 7, at 559.
70. RAZ, supra note 8, at 407-08.
71. Id. at 418.
72. See McClain, supra note 8, at 36.
73. RAZ, supra note 8, at 417.
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ronment, and for its transformation at the hands of past generations, and which culti-
vates agreeable design and good taste in landscaping and urban planning, while not
positively required as a condition of autonomy, is consistent with it. Autonomy re-
quires a public culture and is consistent with a tasteful rather than a vulgar and offen-
sive environment.7 4
But remember that the question now is whether Raz offers a thick or
thin perfectionism, i.e., whether he thinks it appropriate for govern-
ment to persuade on contested conceptions of the good, or instead
merely to provide the seed for citizen debate and choice on conceptions
of the good. He states the following restrictions on perfectionism:
"First, the perfectionist policies must be compatible with respect for
autonomy. They must, therefore, be confined to the creation of the
conditions of autonomy. Second, they must respect the limitation on
the use of coercion that is imposed by the harm principle, as well as
the analogous restriction on manipulation."75 This view differs from
some collectivist beliefs, argues Raz, stating that "[t]he role of gov-
ernment is extensive and inportant, but confined to maintaining
framework conditions conducive to pluralism and autonomy. 76 Thus,
in the end, despite some language suggesting sympathy with a
broader perfectionism, Raz promotes a thin perfectionism, requiring
(not merely permitting) government to lay the foundation for citizens
to develop their own notions of the good life. His argument-and the
arguments of McClain, Fiss, Sunstein, and others7--goes this far, but
no farther.
So the question is whether the argument for thin perfectionism
can stand, and whether it offers any reason to reject a thicker perfec-
tionism. Let me use McClain's thin perfectionism as an example.
What exactly is her argument against government speech pushing a
coiitested conception of the good? One possibility is the concern with
government fanning the flames of controversy. But this is a purely
practical warning ("Don't fan the flames!"), demanding a careful politi-
cal calculus about the efficacy of government speech in a contested
arena. 8 It does not offer a reason in theory to draw a line between the
74. Id. at 421-22.
75. Id. at 423.
76. Id. at 427.
77. See supra note 66-69.
78. As Joseph Raz notes,
The pursuit of full-blooded perfectionist policies, even of those which are entirely sound
and justified, is likely, in many countries if not in all, to backfire in arousing popular
resistance leading to civil strife. In such circumstances compromise is the order of the
day. There is no abstract doctrine which can delineate what the terms of the compromise
should be. All one can say is that it will confine perfectionist measures to matters which
command a large measure of social consensus, and it will further restrict the use of
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contested and the uncontested when it comes to government persua-
sion. Another possibility is suggested by McClain's question: "Whose
perfectionism will supply the content of government's project?'"" In-
deed, for many left-of-center scholars writing about neutrality versus
perfectionism, an overriding concern appears to be the use of govern-
ment speech to advance items on the right-wing agenda. My response
to that concern is this: It is a matter of politics, and not of principle or
constitutional law. Some days your point of view will get pushed;
other days someone else's will; so long as government neither
monopolizes, coerces, or ventriloquizes,' its voice will be one of many,
it will be one of persuasion not coercion, and the speech will be clearly
in the government's voice.
Finally, consider McClain's concern with another prudential
matter, "how a deliberative democracy will resolve conflicts over what
it means to live a good, self-governing life."s, If McClain's concern is
the spillover from government persuasion to government coercion, I
am with her. My argument is not the even thicker perfectionist ar-
gument for government coercion to advance contested conceptions of
the good." But if "resolving conflicts" can be limited to government
speech-i.e., governmental attempts to persuade citizens to adopt one
as opposed to another side of a currently contested social matter-
then I fail to see the theoretical concern with a governmental role in
this discussion.'
More generally, if government believes that one side of a cur-
rently contested social matter offers the better answer to living a good
life-say, encouraging teenagers to use condoms as opposed to teach-
ing abstinence, or the other way around-what is the reason not to
offer that argument to the citizens? Only, I would suggest, the fear
that the government's voice will be too loud (the monopolization con-
cern), or the danger of persuasion slipping into coercion, or the prob-
lem of the government masking its voice as the voice of another. Each
of these is a legitimate concern, and Part III deals with each in detail
below. But absent these problems, should we not trust the citizens to
coercive and of greatly confining measures and will favour gentler measures favouring
one trend or another.
RAZ, supra note 8, at 429.
79. McClain, supra note 8, at 42.
80. See infra Part III.
81. McClain, supra note 8, at 42.
82. But see, e.g., WALL, supra note 2, at 79.
83. Again, putting to one side the possibility of monopoly, coercion, or ventriloquism.
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take the government's view into account in their decisionmaking proc-
ess, and to do so as they evaluate all arguments?'
One final point about the argument for thin perfectionism: To
the extent that some support seed money for parks, libraries, mu-
seums, etc., but refuse to support other government speech initiatives
on the ground that they are improperly partisan (and therefore violate
either principles of liberal democracy or our Constitution's first
amendment), what response can be given to those who deem even
money for parks, libraries, museums, etc. to be entering an arena of
social contest? Remember that those who advocate a caretaker gov-
ernment and thus support Abood-writ-large would object even to the
so-called "neutral" seed money given to these forums of expression.
First of all, they would contend, some views but not all will wind up
being expressed. Second, they would argue, even seed money for
speech forums is not supported by all, and therefore must be seen as
the offspring of a particular view of the good, one that is itself con-
tested. It is not easy to see how the advocates for thin perfectionism
can ward off this challenge.'
III. GOVERNMENT SPEECH IN PRACTICE
The attacks on government speech cannot overcome its virtues.
But this is the general case, and the question remains whether in
practice some instances of government speech might be thought to
violate either the Constitution or some principle of political theory.
Here, much of the scholarship either inveighs against controversial
government speech,' or carves out certain areas in which open forums
may not be altered.87 My approach is different. I would subject gov-
ernment speech to a case by case analysis focusing on three concerns:
monopolization, coercion, and ventriloquism. Only if the speech fails
any of these conditions should it be deemed unconstitutional.8"
84. Indeed, our First Amendment caselaw generally trusts them to evaluate all arguments.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-154.
85. Steven Wall adds, in rejecting thin perfectionism and advocating a thicker perfec-
tionism, that the so-called common principles of justice, or of what constitute citizen autonomy,
might themselves be either wrong (and therefore should be open to scrutiny) or not truly shared
(and therefore no less contested than other conceptions of the good). See WALL, supra note 2, at
98-100, 122-23. Moreover, argues Wall, autonomy is not the only value, and it is valuable only
insofar as it is part of a life made up of valuable pursuits. See id. at 201.
86. See the discussion of viewpoint discrimination infra Part I.A.2.
87. See infra Part IV.
88. See infra Part II.C for a qualification regarding ventriloquism.
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A. Monopolization
Government speech is most justifiable when it is clearly one
voice among many. At the other extreme, government speech is highly
problematic when it is the only voice in a relevant speech market.' As
a theoretical matter, this conclusion flows easily from the multiple
repositories of power theory of our Constitution, whioh is, after all, a
version of pluralism.' The domination of any one voice infringes on
this version of pluralism, be that voice private or public. But unless
one adopts a very broad view of state action, the Constitution is impli-
cated only when the dominant voice is the government's. First
amendment doctrine would easily invalidate government suppression
of dissent in a relevant speech market. The harder question is
whether we should construe the Constitution to invalidate govern-
ment speech when the effect is to monopolize, but without suppressing
dissent. Does this count as abridging the freedom of speech? There
are two separate concerns.
First, I will focus on the effect on citizen decisionmaking, or
autonomy, in a governmentally monopolized speech market. The con-
cern here is with citizen choice under conditions of monopolized infor-
mation; thus, the constitutional objection sounds not in the first
amendment, but rather in substantive due process (i.e., autonomy
more generally).1 Second, I will discuss what many contend is a first
amendment problem-the skewing of public debate by government
speech. For either of these two concerns, actual monopolization
should be understood to violate the Constitution. Whether monopoli-
zation has occurred in a given speech market is, though, a difficult
question. Furthermore, and contrary to the view of many scholars,
viewpoint-based government speech, absent monopolization, should
not be deemed unconstitutional.
89. See Cole, supra note 7, at 680; Post, supra note 4, at 192-93. See generally FISS,
DIVIDED, supra note 7; FISS, IRONY, supra note 7. For a discussion of the government monopoly
problem in connection with unconstitutional conditions generally, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Foreword. Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); see also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1493 (1989).
90. See supra Part H.A; see also YUDOF, supra note 19, at 22 (stating that there must be a
"consciously fostered pluralism in communications networks"). See generally Greene, Irre-
ducible, supra note 10.
91. See Greene, supra note 46, at 480-82.
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1. Undercutting the Knowledge Aspect of Autonomy
Citizen autonomy involves elements of both knowledge and
voluntariness: one should know the full set of arguments and options
before making a choice, and one should be able to make a choice free of
coercion. The problem of government monopolization in a given
speech market implicates the knowledge aspect of citizen autonomy.
When only the government's message is available to a citizen at-
tempting to make a decision, the resulting choice is not the product of
coercion; the citizen's will has not been overborne.' Rather, the re-
sulting choice is the product of such a skewed knowledge base that we
should deem it not knowing. The calculus I set forth here should seem
familiar; it is the basic method for determining whether a constitu-
tional right has been validly waived. The waiver of constitutional
rights must be knowing and voluntary. 3 Waiver under conditions of a
monopolized message cannot be considered knowing.
If this argument makes sense in theory, the next question is
how to apply it in practice. Can judges determine in a reasonably
reliable fashion when the government has monopolized speech in a
relevant market? This would involve figuring out (a) when monopoli-
zation has occurred (or, perhaps, is in danger of occurring) and (b)
what counts as a relevant speech market. Examining Rust v. Sullivan
reveals some of the complexities of this judicial inquiry. 9 In Rust, the
Court upheld the Reagan Administration's abortion counsel-
ing/referral "gag rule," under which public health clinics, as a condi-
tion of receiving federal funds, were prohibited from counseling preg-
nant women about abortion or referring them to abortion providers.
No such gag rule was placed on discussions about carrying fetuses to
term. The Court reasoned that the government was not forcing
women to forego abortion, nor was the government forcing health
facilities to take federal funds. The government was acting in a
merely persuasive role, encouraging childbirth but not insisting on it.
There is a fairly strong argument, however, that for the indigent
women who use public health facilities, the information they receive
92. I deal below in Part III.B with the argument that government speech is coercive.
93. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-66 (1938).
94. One could perhaps argue that citizen choice regarding the exercise of a constitutional
right should be subject to this knowing and voluntary test, but that government speech should be
less closely scrutinized in situations in which constitutional rights are not at stake. Any gov-
ernment speech that produces either a not knowing or not voluntary citizen choice, however, can
be understood as undermining citizen autonomy. Accordingly, my discussion will not turn on
whether constitutional rights are being exercised.
95. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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there, from the only medical professionals they know and trust, is the
only information they will receive and rely on regarding the choice
between abortion and childbirth.' If the government insists that in-
formation about childbirth only be available, and is, in the public
health clinic setting, blocking any information about abortion or even
referral to other sources of such information, perhaps we should con-
clude that the government has monopolized a particular speech mar-
ket. Thus, the resulting decisions of the women in question are not
properly knowing and therefore not properly autonomous. We could
consider this a violation of the right in question (here, the right to
choose between abortion and childbirth) or a violation of substantive
due process/autonomy more generally.
The problem with this argument is that information about
abortion is available elsewhere. The real question is whether the
affected women have access to this information, or should we say,
have "reasonable" access to this information. This seems to be an
empirical question; one could imagine some towns or cities in which
abortion information is easily available, and others in which it is not.
If we are to resolve these cases on the empirical evidence, then we
would also have to know the extent and reliability of informal infor-
mation networks that might be available to pregnant women." But
one might argue that the question is not merely empirical. One might
suggest that so long as dissent is not suppressed (i.e., abortion infor-
mation generally is not prohibited by law), pregnant women have full
autonomy because they can, in theory, access such information.
This is tough stuff, in large part because identifying the rele-
vant speech market is so hard.98 In Rust, is it the public health clinic,
in which the government clearly has monopolized speech, or is it the
pregnant woman's community at large, in which such monopolization
has not (or might not have) occurred? Take another example, the for-
mer California Elections Code § 3572 ("Elections Code § 3572")." That
96. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993).
97. See EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 300 (no obvious barriers to entry in the market for pro-
viding abortion information, there might be little alternative to governmentally funded infor-
mation in some areas).
98. For general discussion of both product and geographic markets, see HA PHILLIP E.
AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
§ 550-65 (1995 & Supp. 1999). For an important and relevant case regarding how broadly or
narrowly to define a market, based on whether "consumers" in fact view other sources of supply
as substitutes (and thus relevant to cases such as Rust in determining whether citizens in fact
get information elsewhere than from the government), see generally FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
99. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3572 (recodified at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9087 (West 1996)). (1985),
repealed Stats. 1994 ch. 920 §1.
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section empowered the government to place a statement of projected
financial impact on the ballot of a proposed initiative. No other mes-
sages were permitted on the initiative ballot. Steve Shiffrin argues
that because the voter is, at the moment of voting, a captive audience,
this form of monopolization is unconstitutional, for even if the finan-
cial impact statement makes accurate projections, the question is
"whether the government should be able to monopolize for itself the
right to address the merits of an issue on the ballot or to call the
voters' attention to issues which it and perhaps it alone wishes con-
sidered."" But is the moment of voting the relevant speech market for
measuring monopolization? Groups dissenting from the government's
position were allowed to speak all they wanted during the initiative
campaign. Is the campaign the relevant speech market or the moment
of voting? Both here and in the Rust setting, the degree of captivity of
the relevant citizen group is important to the analysis,"' but hard to
reach clear conclusions about in any given case.
Another issue affecting the autonomy aspect of monopolization
is the accuracy of the government speech. In Rust and Elections Code
§ 3572, the government's speech was not so much inaccurate as in-
complete. But what if the government deliberately distorts the truth,
or, less nefariously, what if the result of government speech is such a
distortion, even if not intentional? Meese v. Keene... involved such a
problem. Federal law at the time classified films made by agents of
foreign governments as political propaganda." The plaintiff alleged
that such a classification would make it more difficult to exhibit cer-
tain films made by the National Film Board of Canada. Note that
although the statute classifies such films as political propaganda, no
such label need be attached to the films' distribution, although distri-
bution must include disclosure of the connection to the foreign gov-
ernment. The Court upheld the statute, ruling both that the term
"propaganda" has a nonpejorative as well as pejorative meaning and
that the statute simply adds to the information potential viewers have
in evaluating whether to see a film. The Court refused to accept dis-
senting Justice Blackmun's concerns that the average potential viewer
would attach a pejorative meaning to the term "propaganda," and
would be (in some instances, at least) deterred from seeing the film."
The Court did not seriously address this argument, but it raises a dif-
100. Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 639 (footnote omitted).
101. See YUDOF, supra note 19, at 169-70.
102. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
103. Id. at 467 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621), 469-70.
104. Id. at 483-85.
[Vol. 53:1
GOVERNMENT OF THE GOOD
ficult question: Are there constitutional limits on government decep-
tion or on unintentional government misinformation? Even if we ac-
cept the Court's claim that propaganda has a nonpejorative meaning,
surely Justice Blackmun is correct that the average potential film
viewer would consider the term as indicating a slanted, deliberately
distorted government message. If the relevant films are not propa-
ganda in this commonly understood sense, has the U.S. government
distorted that truth, thus rendering citizen choices (whether to see the
film) not properly knowing?
These questions are difficult, but worth asking on a case by
case basis. The ad hoc approach, I will contend throughout Part III, is
preferable to either total deference to government persuasion or the
categorical approach advocated by others."5
2. Skewing Public Discourse
The matters I have discussed-Rust, Elections Code § 3572,
and Meese-involve government speech that might be thought to dis-
tort a particular citizen choice by monopolizing a relevant speech
market. The Rust gag rule might result in more children born and
fewer abortions. The Elections Code § 3572 ballot statement might
produce a victory for the government's side in the initiative campaign.
The Meese propaganda label might dissuade viewers from seeing the
films in question. Whether monopolization is sufficient to render
choice unknowing can be determined only on a case by case basis.
Other types of government speech affect specific instances of citizen
autonomy less directly, but might endanger pluralism through skew-
ing viewpoint diversity. The concern is that by pushing one point of
view at the expense of another, government will improperly distort
public debate. One of the main attacks on the "standards of decency"
provision upheld in NEA v. Finley1" is its capacity to skew art in a
105. See infra Part IV.
106. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). Congress had amended the relevant statute,
providing that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] appli-
cations are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public." Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)).
The Court upheld the statute on its face, i4 a messy opinion that provides fodder for both sides in
the continuing debate. On the one hand, the Court stated that the new criteria "do not silence
speakers by expressly 'threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.'" Id. at 583 (quoting MA.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992)) (alteration in original). Furthermore, the Court explained that "[a]ny
content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a
consequence of the nature of arts funding," and that "absolute neutrality is simply 'incon-
ceivable.' " Id. at 585. On the other hand, the Court stated, "If the NEA were to leverage its
power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored view-
points, then we would confront a different case." Id. at 587.
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mainstream direction, away from the unorthodox. There are three
issues to discuss here: First, what is viewpoint discrimination? Sec-
ond, why is viewpoint discrimination problematic in a regulatory stat-
ute? Third, is viewpoint discrimination similarly problematic in the
government speech setting?
Identifying viewpoint discrimination is notoriously difficult.
There are easy cases, of course-it is clearly viewpoint discrimination
to prohibit speech opposed to the Mayor but to permit speech sup-
porting him-but the Court's treatment of this area has been unsatis-
factory. In Boos v. Barry," the Court invalidated a District of Colum-
bia law prohibiting protests outside foreign embassies, but permitting
supportive demonstrations. In so doing, however, the Court said the
law was not viewpoint-based, but rather had excluded a category of
speech. This seems wrong. To be sure, the ordinance did not single
out any particular viewpoint for regulation (say, anti-Israeli or anti-
Arab). Nonetheless, the law on its face allowed support for, but not
criticism of, foreign governments outside their embassies; in the sepa-
rate context of each embassy, the law seems viewpoint-based both
facially and as applied.
Then in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia,' the Court considered a challenge to the University of
Virginia's scheme of using mandatory student fees for funding various
programs. In particular, the scheme barred funding for religious,
political, and philanthropic student publications, while permitting
funding for other student journals. The Court concluded (in the con-
text of a challenge brought by an unfunded Christian religious publi-
cation) that the limitation was viewpoint-based. But the University
would have funded many publications with religious viewpoints con-
tained therein-a sports publication, a music publication, a publica-
tion on world affairs, etc. What the University seemed to be trying to
do was refuse funding to publications that would appear particularly
sectarian or controversial, either in terms of politics or religion." In
other words, the scheme did not bar the expression of religious view-
points, but rather religion (and politics) as the primary subject of a
periodical. There was no skewing of debate in favor of one viewpoint
over others.
It is hard to know how to characterize the standards of decency
provision at issue in Finley. From one angle, it is viewpoint-based-
107. 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988).
108. 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995).
109. I take it that the exclusion of philanthropic publications had a separate and totally
defensible justification.
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the NEA could fund a patriotic depiction of the American flag, but
could not fund a painting of a defaced, pissed-on flag (the reference is
to Serrano's Piss Christ,' using urine in a different fashion). The pro-
USA viewpoint would be funded, but not the anti-USA viewpoint. But
from another angle, the "decency" amendment is not viewpoint-
based-the NEA could not fund (arguably) a painting of an aborted
fetus by a right-to-life supporter, but neither could it fund (arguably) a
painting by a pro-choice supporter of a woman injured by a back-alley
abortion. Whether strictly viewpoint-based or not, though, the de-
cency provision certainly represents a governmental effort to enhance
a certain kind of artistic orthodoxy."1'
It is difficult to know whether a statute is viewpoint discrimi-
natory in part because whether we see viewpoint discrimination de-
pends on whether an issue is seen as disputed in the current legal
culture." For example, if one had lived during an era in which homo-
sexuality was widely thought to be deviant, a statement to that effect
might not have seemed the expression of a viewpoint, but rather just
the recitation of a fact. When, later in time, homosexuality becomes
more widely (but still not uniformly) accepted, a similar statement
now seems viewpoint-based. There are many examples of this-think
of shifting societal understandings of smoking, littering, or cleaning
up after one's dog."3
When we do see viewpoint discrimination by government, we
usually think it is unconstitutional, at least in the criminal/regulatory
setting. Governmental favoring of certain viewpoints through the
regulation of other viewpoints reflects both invidious purpose and un-
acceptable effects. Viewpoint discrimination is strong evidence of the
desire of the "ins" to exert their political muscle by harming the
110. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 574-75.
111. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 312.
112. For insightful discussion of the distinction between the "contested" and the
"uncontested" for purposes of constitutional interpretation generally, see Lawrence Lessig, Erie-
Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1802
(1997) ("An issue is contestable when there is actual and substantial disagreement about it (that
is, when it is actually contested), and when that disagreement is in the foreground of social life
(that is, when it is seen and understood as generally contested).'); Lessig, supra note 27, at 683;
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1393-1400 (1997).
113. As Elena Kagan puts it:
The very notion of viewpoint discrimination rests on a background understanding of a
disputed issue. If one sees no dispute, one will see no viewpoints, and correspondingly
one will see no viewpoint discrimination in any action the government takes. Similarly,
how one defines a dispute will have an effect on whether one sees a government action as
viewpoint discriminatory.
Kagan, supra note 7, at 70 (footnote omitted).
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"outs."'4 Such a legislative purpose cannot be considered legitimate, at
least in the regulatory setting. In addition, regulatory viewpoint dis-
crimination poses too great a risk that the diversity we expect in any
given speech market will dry up, replaced by the government's favored
position. As Geof Stone writes, "[T]he first amendment is concerned,
not only with the extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of
communication, but also-and perhaps even more fundamentally-
with the extent to which the law distorts public debate.""' 5
Despite the arguments of many scholars"6 and occasional
Supreme Court dicta,"7 the constitutional arguments against regula-
tory viewpoint discrimination do not apply to government speech
(direct or through funding conditions) that is viewpoint discrimina-
tory. If government speech monopolizes a speech market, then I agree
it is unconstitutional, both because it disrupts the knowledge aspect of
citizen autonomy and because it converts public discourse from the
voice of many (or at least some) to the voice of one. But if in a given
case the government is not monopolizing a speech market, if dissent-
ing views are readily produced and out there to be heard and seen,
then there is no disruption of autonomy based on skewed knowledge
and no reduction of viewpoint diversity. In such cases, the govern-
ment's favored view will be one among many views worth supporting,
and it will be valuable for the citizens to know which view the gov-
ernment favors and for the majority to be able to advance its notion of
the good. For example, in Finley, if the decency provision results in
more mainstream art, but dissident art is still produced and available,
there is little reason to strike down the provision. One might object
that even in the setting of viewpoint-based regulation, our concerns
with skewing effects are about risk and not actuality. We do not, that
is, demand proof that such a statute has skewed debate, but merely
114. For discussion of improper government motivation through content discrimination, see
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54-57 (1987) [hereinafter
Stone, Content-Neutral]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 103 (1978) [hereinafter Stone, Restrictions].
115. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 114, at 198; see also Stone, Restrictions, supra
note 114, at 101; Stone, Content-Neutral, supra note 114, at 54-57.
116. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 115; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at
310; Cole, supra note 7, at 687; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 432 (1996); Kagan,
supra note 7, at 55-56, 67; Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 568; Sullivan, supra note 89, at
1496.
117. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998); see also id. at 610-16 (Souter, J., dis-
senting); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983).
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that viewpoint-based statutes carry too great a risk of doing so. Is
such a risk not also present, one might argue, with viewpoint-based
government speech? The answer is that a real distortion of public
debate is far less likely from government speech than from restrictions
on private speech, precisely because in the government speech setting
many viewpoints are still aired, while in the regulatory setting one
viewpoint is legally barred. Additionally, the virtues of government
speech discussed in Part II are present when the government speaks
or funds private speech on certain conditions. Such virtues are not
present when government merely restricts the private expression of a
particular point of view. Thus, we correctly invalidate regulatory
viewpoint discrimination because, unlike (most) government speech, it
affects the autonomy of those regulated, and because the virtues of
government speech are absent in a scheme that merely prohibits
private speech.
Many scholars seem to think that government speech on an
uncontested matter is fine, while government speech in an arena of
social contest is not. We should now be able to see that this distinc-
tion is a proxy for the concern about viewpoint discrimination, and we
should reject it just as we reject that concern in the nonregulatory set-
ting. Cass Sunstein, after explaining why viewpoint discrimination in
government funding programs is generally impermissible1 '8 (for rea-
sons I have just considered and rejected), muses that "viewpoint dis-
crimination may be acceptable in some narrow circumstances." ' He
gives as examples (a) funding programs that celebrate democracy and
(b) funding programs on the Civil War that forbid advocating slav-
ery." We should apply the prohibition on viewpoint funding, says
Sunstein, "only in the most straightforward cases of viewpoint dis-
crimination," permitting "aesthetic or qualitative judgments so long as
they are not conspicuously based on partisan aims. ' 2  Elsewhere,
Sunstein confirms this intuition when he suggests that government
may be "permitted to discriminate on the basis of point of view if (1) it
is doing so in the context of sharply limited, discrete initiatives and (2)
the viewpoint discrimination does not involve taking sides in a cur-
rently contested political debate."' Pro-democracy and anti-smoking
funding, thus, might be permissible, perhaps because each of these
ends has "come to be understood as a sufficiently shared, sufficiently
118. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 310; see also SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra
note 7, at 117, 228, 231.
119. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 311.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 312.
122. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 231.
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nonpartisan goal as to escape the prohibition on viewpoint discrimi-
nation. 2 3
Others echo similar positions, often without making the con-
nection between the category "uncontested/noncontroversial" and the
absence of viewpoint discrimination.' For example, Elena Kagan
says that intuitively we believe a governmental 'No Smoking" cam-
paign is permissible (without funding a "Smoke' campaign).' There
are three reasons for this, she says. First, "the debate in this case, by
its nature, offers the hope of right and wrong answers-answers sub-
ject to verification and proof."1 26 Second, "society has reached a shared
consensus on the issue; the answers, in addition to being verifiable,
are widely believed.""' Third, and most important, she says, "one side
of the debate appears to do great harm."'2 8 This third reason, though,
is hard to apply consistently across cases and probably merely restates
the other two reasons. These go to the contingent cultural fact that, at
this point in time, smoking appears to be something (a) subject to
scientific scrutiny and (b) on which we have reached a consensus. But
why should this be relevant to the first amendment question? It is
because, as Sunstein suggests, it helps show how we fail to see the
matter as one in which viewpoint is contested.'29 Therefore, when the
government funds "No Smoking" (and not "Smoke') and "Pro-democ-
racy" (and not 'Pro-Marxism") we do not see it as entering an arena of
viewpoint debate. Thus, it is easier to accept the government speech
or funding condition.
We should note three things here. First, these scholars who
would permit government speech on issues for which there is a broad
social consensus would impose constitutional restrictions on govern-
ment speech that enters an arena of current social controversy. This
might be merely a prudential concern.2 0 But to the extent it is an
argument from principle, which it often appears to be, it makes little
sense apart from its role as a proxy for exposing viewpoint discrimina-
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. See EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 311; GALSTON, supra note 30, at 256; see also WALL,
supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that many neutralists "have no objection to the idea that political
morality should be informed by shared ideals of the good. They object only to the idea that
political morality should be informed by controversial idealsV). For an extended discussion on
this matter in the setting of public monuments, see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN
STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998).
125. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 75.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 231.
130. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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tion. And as a categorical argument against viewpoint discrimination
in government speech, it is wrong for reasons I have discussed
above. '
Second, the very plasticity of the category "viewpoint discrimi-
nation" should give one pause before condemning government speech
on this ground. Even in the setting of the regulation of private speech,
we should now be aware that our ability to ascertain what appears to
be viewpoint discrimination (bad) versus what appears to be fact or
science (fine) is distorted by the lenses we happen to wear. In the set-
ting of the regulation of private speech, however, the potential harm to
personal autonomy and public debate, combined with the absence of
the virtues of government speech, are sufficient to warrant judicial
intervention. But in the setting of government speech-where auton-
omy is not (generally) infringed and where the virtues of the govern-
ment pushing a position are present-we should be cautious about in-
voking "viewpoint discrimination as a reason for judicial intervention.
Our caution is justified by the reasons I have mentioned above132 and
because the very category "viewpoint discrimination" is itself in con-
stant flux.
Third, even though we might "see' viewpoint discrimination
from government speech in arenas of current social contest only, and
therefore be more willing to accept government speech on currently
uncontested matters, this is not how things would work regarding the
regulation of private speech. We would not accept a statute barring
private speakers from advocating "Smoke" or 'Pro-Marxism." We
would see the viewpoint bias there, even though it is bias against
(perhaps) a small minority only. Those who support government
speech on relatively uncontested matters only have not adequately
addressed this point.
I have argued, in this Section, that viewpoint-based govern-
ment speech should not be deemed unconstitutional (unless it in fact
monopolizes a particular speech market). There should be an excep-
tion to this principle, however, for viewpoint-based government speech
that either (a) favors views supportive of the current administration or
majority party while disfavoring views of the opposition, or (b) favors
views extolling the virtues of a particular race, religion, or gender or
casting aspersions on a particular race, religion, or gender. The con-
cern here is not that the government has violated rules about monop-
oly, coercion, or ventriloquism. Rather, viewpoint-based speech of the
type described violates cardinal constitutional norms, based in struc-
131. See supra text accompanying note 116-117.
132. See id.
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ture and text. For example, while I have argued that it is constitu-
tional for government to fund decent art and refuse to fund indecent
art, it is unconstitutional for government to fund art supporting the
administration and refuse to fund art criticizing the administration.
This type of viewpoint-based funding tends toward entrenching the
current ruling party, and blocks the paths of political change. It thus
violates one of the two key principles of the famous footnote four on
Carolene Products,133 and should be deemed invalid. As another exam-
ple, it should be considered unconstitutional for government to fund
speech praising whites and refuse to fund speech praising blacks.
This violates another of the key Carolene Products' footnote four prin-
ciples, threatening to harm discrete and insular minorities.
Now it is true that for both of my hypothetical cases, govern-
ment monopoly power does not necessarily exist, and therefore one
could say, "Why not let the government express its point of view-
directly or through funding-and leave it to dissenters to express their
point of view?" I need to answer this in two parts. First, the Carolene
Products-based exception I discuss here applies to much government
speech-such as speech conditions in funding programs or govern-
ment-sponsored advertising campaigns-but does not apply to some
other government speech. Thus, it would be permissible for a gov-
ernment official or legislator to extol the virtues of her party in a
speech, and it would also be permissible (though condemnable) for a
government official or legislator to denigrate another race in a speech.
Second, my argument that much viewpoint-based government speech
is permissible does not depend on its being ineffectual, and is not blind
to the risk that it might help entrench orthodox mores. Thus, the
standards of decency provision in Finley might well have some effect
on the production of dissident art,"3 but I would still argue that it is
constitutional despite being (most likely) viewpoint-based, so long as
the government is properly considered one player among many in the
relevant speech market. Using government funds to entrench the
ruling party or disfavor a disliked racial minority, however, creates too
great a risk of blocking the channels of political change or of further
ghettoizing a discrete and insular minority. Thus, for reasons ex-
pressed in Carolene Products' footnote four and well developed by
133. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
134. Of course the effect might be perverse-it might encourage more dissident art (not NEA-
funded) as a reaction to the restriction.
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John Ely in Democracy and Distrust,135 such funding must be con-
sidered invalid.
In an important current case that the Court might review,"
the Second Circuit relied on a distinction of this sort to invalidate a
speech condition in the federal statute funding the Legal Services
Corporation. The provision in question refuses funding for a person or
entity
that initiates legal representation or participates in any other way in litigation, lobby-
ing, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system, ex-
cept that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from repre-
senting an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency
if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in
effect on the date of the initiation of the representation. 137
The Second Circuit, via Judge Leval, construed the first part of this
provision as applying both to those who favor and to those who oppose
welfare reform. Thus, reading the first part as subject-matter based
and not viewpoint-based, the court upheld it.138 But the court deemed
the second part of the provision viewpoint-based, for it allows "funding
to those who represent clients without making any challenge to exist-
ing rules of law, but denies it to those whose representation challenges
existing rules."39 The court distinguished the permitted viewpoint-
based funding in Rust and Finley4' by maintaining that
135. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 75-104
(1980).
136. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 767-72 (2d Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc
denied, (July 2, 1999); but see Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1024-27 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998).
137. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§ 504 (a)(16), 110 Stat. 1321-55-56 (1996).
138. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 769.
139. Id. at 769-70.
140. There is some language in both Rust and Finley suggesting that the Court did not deem
the speech restriction in either case viewpoint-based. In Rust, the Court stated that in
promulgating the abortion counseling gag rule, "the Government has not discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other." 500
U.S. 173, 193 (1991). This is best read as holding that the gag rule does not constitute imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination; the gag rule certainly favored the "give birth to your child"
point of view over the "it's okay to have an abortion" point of view. In Finley, the Court wrote
that "If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria
into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case." 524 U.S. 569,
587 (1998); see also id. at 583 (standards of decency provision does not "engender the kind of
directed viewpoint discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its
face"). But the standards of decency provision upheld facially in Finley, even if not strictly
speaking viewpoint-based (discussed at text accompanying note 111, supra), still clearly favors
mainstream over dissident art. Thus, the Court must have been content with a certain amount
of governmental favoring of one view of the world ('decent") versus another view of the world
("indecent"). Also note that the Finley Court stated that "absolute neutrality is simply 'incon-
ceivable' " in the arts funding process, id. at 585, and that "[a]ny content-based considerations
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different types of speech enjoy different degrees of protection under the First Amend-
ment .... The strongest protection of the First Amendments free speech guarantee
goes to the right to [criticize] government or advocate change in governmental
policy.... In our view, a lawyer's argument to a court that a statute, rule, or govern-
mental practice standing in the way of a client's claim is unconstitutional or otherwise
illegal falls far closer to the First Amendment's most protected categories of speech
than abortion counseling or indecent art.14 '
Although not expressly relying on Carolene Products' footnote four or
Ely's elucidation thereon, this argument by Judge Leval rests on
similar logic, and should be sustained if the matter reaches the
Supreme Court.
The difficulties discussed in this Section with case by case
determinations of whether monopolization has occurred have led
scholars to propose certain areas of speech in which open forum rules
must govern."' As Steve Shiffrin puts it, it is better to engage in some
form of categorical balancing than to attempt ad hoc inquiries into the
presence of monopolization or other relevant factors.' 3 I will discuss
this move toward categorical balancing in Part IV. The questions
judges would have to answer using a case by case approach, however,
do not appear more difficult than many other questions judges have to
answer in matters of constitutional law. Although determining
whether unacceptable monopolization has occurred might be tough,
and although the questions I will discuss below about coercion and
ventriloquism are hard, too, so long as the concerns can be identified,
case by case analysis is worth trying. It may be, though, that we will
not see too many invalidations based on monopolization. As Fred
Schauer has written, "[W]e ought to be highly skeptical of the com-
monly used metaphor that the government's voice 'drowns out' other
voices."'"
that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of
arts funding." Id.
141. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 771.
142. See infra Part V.A.
143. See Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 600, 607, 610, 646-47.
144. Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 380 (1983)
(reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983)); see also Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 252 (1992). I have deliberately
avoided extended discussion of the difficult problem of government speech in public schools.
Because of legislation requiring schooling until a specified age, and because many families
cannot afford private schools, public schools are often the only option for many children. School
boards, principals, and teachers must make subject-matter and viewpoint-based decisions all the
time, and courts are reluctant to second-guess such decisions. For this general pattern of
deference to be appropriate-and I think it is-we must see the public schools as just one venue
in which children learn. They are exposed to different ways of learning and ideas in their homes,
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B. Coercion
Many scholars writing in this area are concerned not only with
government monopolization in a given speech market (i.e., the knowl-
edge aspect of autonomy and the problem of skewing public discourse),
but also with government speech moving beyond persuasion to coer-
cion (i.e., the voluntariness aspect of autonomy).' 5 In the Section
above, I shared the concern that government speech might, in some
instances, capture a speech market so as to endanger knowing choice.
I am less sympathetic, however, with the notion that government
speech might be coercive, thereby endangering the voluntariness of
choice. If we are to maintain an analytic separation between the
knowledge and voluntariness aspects of autonomy, then we must
think of coercion not as choice under a severely limited base of knowl-
edge, but rather as choice under a kind of pressure that allows us
fairly to say, "she did not choose; she was compelled." Our standard
paradigm for coercion involves action in the face of a threat of private
force ("do X or I'll kill you") or public force ("do X or we'll jail you"). We
accept analogues to coercion from without when we permit a defense
based on either justification (e.g., "I acted in self-defense") or excuse
(e.g., "I couldn't help but do it because of the following psychologi-
cal/biochemical condition"). But in each of these settings, we do not
in their churches and synagogues, and from various other associations (little league, Boy Scouts,
etc.) and cultural outlets (movies, music, etc.). For a discussion of monopoly in the setting of
educating children, which supports a strong role for public schools, see Greene, Vouchers, supra
note 14, at 406-08.
Although I leave for another day more detailed discussion of government speech in the public
schools, I will comment briefly on the Court's major case in this area, Board of Education v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982). A local school board ordered certain books removed from the shelves of the
public high school library. The record was unclear as to the reasons, and the Court's holding was
that summary judgment for the school board was improper, that the matter should proceed to
trial. If such library decisions are totally within the board's discretion, this result would be
wrong, and so the question was what constitutional limits exist over the board's discretion, if
any? The Justices were sharply divided, with four essentially supporting the position that the
board may remove books for vulgarity but not for disagreement with ideas, see opinions of
Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., another four essentially supporting the position that the school
board has (virtually) complete discretion, see opinions of Burger, C.J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J.,
and O'Connor, J., and one basically avoiding the hard issues altogether, see opinion of White, J.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion is best here, I believe. He maintains that the government's role as
educator requires it to make decisions based often on the personal or moral values of those in
charge, and that this is appropriate because "the government is engaged in inculcating social
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people." Id. at 909. Although he would
make an exception for book removal based on party affiliation or racial animus (see supra the
discussion at text accompanying notes 133-141), he thought it not unconstitutional for the school
board to act for a variety of other reasons.
145. This is a central theme of Mark Yudofs work. See YUDOF, supra note 19, at xv, xvi, 6,
15, 73, 93, 152; see also Cole, supra note 7, at 711; Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 555;
Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 608, 611.
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accept anything less. That is, "do X or I'll kill you" is different from
"do X because it's best for you." Although there are difficult cases at
the margin, we generally accept the distinction between coercion and
persuasion, deeming action pursuant to persuasion a proper exercise
of autonomy. Most scholars writing about government speech do not
explicitly argue that merely persuasive government speech should be
deemed invalid; that should happen only when such speech is properly
deemed coercive.14 But some scholars do suggest that certain types of
government speech should be considered improperly persuasive. And
there is a further-reaching argument that the line between persuasion
and coercion itself is unstable, rendering even apparently persuasive
speech illegitimate.
I object to all of these moves. Taking them in reverse order:
the line between persuasion and coercion is basically sound, although
difficult at the margins; the notion of government speech as improp-
erly persuasive should be rejected; and although I cannot object in
theory to invalidating government speech that is properly deemed
coercive, in practice, there are virtually no examples of such speech.
Let me start with the line between coercion and persuasion."'
Consider basic first amendment doctrine regarding the regulation of
private speech. With a few exceptions (sexual speech being the key
example), the government may regulate speech based on content only
in categories involving some sort of imminent physical harm from the
speech in question. Thus, the tests the government must pass to
regulate advocacy of unlawful action,48 fighting words,"9 and speech
before hostile audiences'" all attempt to identify those speech acts that
146. I am speaking now only about arguments for invalidation based on the intrusion on the
voluntariness of citizen choice, and not about other arguments for invalidation of government
speech because of monopoly, ventriloquism, or anything else.
147. For a stab at defining coercion in the general setting of unconstitutional conditions, see
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1300-01 (1984) ('Threats are allocations that make a citizen worse off than
she otherwise would be because of her exercise of a constitutional right. Offers merely expand
her range of options, leaving the citizen better off.); compare RAZ, supra note 8, at 149 (stating
that it is a condition of coercion that "Q believes that it is likely that P will bring about C if Q
does A and that C would leave him worse off, having done A, than if he did not do A and P did
not bring about C"). But see SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 298-301 (finding it hard to
know what someone is "otherwise" entitled to). Most scholars writing about unconstitutional
conditions are ultimately forced to concede that no general doctrine exists, but rather that
normative analysis in the setting of the various rights involved is needed. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 89, at 16; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 229-30, 292; Frederick Schauer, Too Hard&
Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENy. U. L. REV.
989, 1005 (1995); Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1443-46.
148. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
149. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
150. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
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are likely to lead to immediate physical harm without time for delib-
eration, for "more speech." We allow the regulation of libel subject to
various tests, 5' but the core concern with libel is the harm from false,
defamatory speech, which we believe inflicts a kind of harm that is not
easy to repair. As is revealed sharply by the most recent cases grant-
ing nearly full protection for commercial speech, '52 the fact that speech
might be persuasive is not a valid ground for regulation. The Court
considers that sort of argument improperly paternalistic. In sum, one
of the basic principles underlying the strong protection of private
speech is that the persuasive effect of speech is not a proper reason for
regulation. Only when there is no time for counterargument, or when
persuasion will not cure the original harm, do we permit regulation of
speech.
We should think no differently about government speech."n As-
suming that dissent is open, and assuming no monopolization, we
should consider even quite persuasive government speech to be just
that, quite persuasive, and hold fast the distinction between persua-
sion and coercion. It is one thing for government to make a compelling
case for a position; it is another for it to say "do X or we'll jail you." If
we were to assume, to the contrary, that citizens respond to persua-
sive speech the same way they respond to coercive speech, then the
predicate for much free speech doctrine-a person's ability to hear
arguments and make up her mind-would be undercut.
Thus, I reject Jon Elster's argument for treating (at least cer-
tain versions of) persuasion as similar to coercion. Elster writes:
Coercion takes place when an individual prefers x over y, and continues to do so even
when someone (physically) coerces him into doing y. Voluntary choice [the opposite
end of the spectrum] means that the individual initially prefers y over x, and does y for
that reason.... Seduction [next after coercion] occurs when an individual initially pre-
fers x over y, but comes to prefer y over x once he has been coerced into doing
y .... Persuasion [next, and closest to voluntary choice] means, then, that an indi-
vidual is led by a sequence of short-term improvements into preferring y over x, even if
initially he preferred x over y. My contention is that persuasion is more similar to
seduction than to voluntary choice. This, at least, holds when the persuasion is not
151. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 374 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964).
152. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
153. For general support of government persuasion while rejecting government coercion, see
MILL, supra note 17, at 68-69, 141-46, 163. See also GALSTON, supra note 30, at 178, 249, 261-62;
HURKA, supra note 17, at 158-60; RAZ, supra note 8, at 161 ("[N]ot all perfectionist action is a
coercive imposition of a style of life. Much of it could be encouraging and facilitating action of the
desired kind, or discouraging undesired modes of behavior."); id. at 417, 420. For general
support of the classic line between coercion and persuasion, not necessarily in the setting of
government speech, see BERLIN, supra note 19, at 122.
154. See Schauer, supra note 144, at 380, 385.
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accompanied by a statement of intention informing the individual that he is about to be
manipulated. Exploiting intrapsychic mechanisms that are unknown to the individual
can never be justified... [w]e must refuse Robert Nozick's contention that induce-
ments are never coercive; they are if they are made for the purpose of leading the indi-
vidual somewhere he might not want to go. There is no essential difference between
coercion and seduction, nor between seduction and this form of persuasion. 155
On this argument, persuasion blends into coercion when the "per-
suader" does not disclose to her listener that she is seeking to bring
the listener along to a certain conclusion. Using the term "manipula-
tion" here seems to me unhelpful, and question-begging. Life is full of
situations in which we try to get people to do things they initially do
not want to do. Often, we are aware of the type of argument that will
work with the listener in question, yet we do not reveal our rhetorical
strategy. It seems odd to me-more than odd, in fact, actually a
manipulation of ordinary meaning-to describe such everyday
attempts at getting people to do what we want as tantamount to coer-
cion."  I agree with one implication of Elster's argument, however.
Failure to disclose material information can, in some instances, render
the listener's choice not fully knowing."
Other scholars, perhaps recognizing the difficulty of collapsing
the persuasion/coercion distinction, argue that government speech
may be improperly persuasive. One version of this argument, sug-
gested to me in conversation by Linda McClain, " suggests that on cer-
tain sorts of issues, such as those involving patriotism and citizenship,
people will grant too much deference to the government. Another ver-
sion, suggested to me in conversation by Kenneth Anderson, main-
tains that governmental invocation of expertise falsely lulls the citi-
zenry into assuming a certain consensus. As Stephen Gardbaum puts
the general argument:
With respect specifically to authority, the state is special because it cannot purport to
act nonauthoritatively. A way of life that the state endorses and promotes, even
through symbolic or persuasive means, is an "authorized" way of life. The concern is
that individuals may defer to the state's authority, just as we normally wish them to do
155. ELSTER, supra note 25, at 81-83; see also McClain, supra note 8, at 47-48.
156. For another argument about manipulation, to which I have the same set of responses as
I do to Elster, see RAZ, supra note 8, at 377-78 ("Manipulation, unlike coercion, does not interfere
with a person's options. Instead it perverts the way that person reaches decisions, forms
preferences or adopts goals. It too is an invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the
importance of the distortion it causes); see also WALL, supra note 2, at 136. But see SHER, supra
note 17, at 63 (arguing one's response to nonrational manipulation can in fact be properly
autonomous).
157. See supra Part Ill.A.1.
158. See also Carole I. Chervin, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government
Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 428-29 (1989).
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in the case of general obedience to the law. Yet, adopting a valuable way of life out of
deference to authority is counterproductive from the perspective of autonomy.159
Although these scholars are surely right in suggesting that
government speech might at times carry great weight, I do not see
why we should be suspicious of such weight. So long as dissent is
open and the relevant speech market is not monopolized, people can
reject government arguments about patriotism and citizenship. If
they do not, and in fact grant great deference to the government's
position, perhaps that is because of a considered judgment, or one that
fits their notions of citizenship. Similarly, when government speaks
in reliance on expertise, attempting to persuade citizens that a matter
is basically settled and that they should just join in, we should not
deem this improperly persuasive so long as other voices may be aired
in the relevant speech market. Those voices can challenge the gov-
ernment's assertions of expertise and consensus. Moreover, Gard-
baum's argument implies that we sometimes make choices not heavily
influenced by authority, and that choice out of deference to authority
is not true choice at all. But neither point can be correct. No choice is
made exogenously to the various authority structures in which one
lives (e.g., government-citizen, parent-child, spouse-spouse, friend-
friend, human being-God, etc.). We make choices under the influence
of many whom we consider authorities, and we even make choices
under the influence of subconscious authority. So unless we are to
adopt an unrealistic, solipsistic notion of autonomy, we must accept
choice in a web of power relations. We must deem nonautonomous
only those choices made under the influence of particularly overbear-
ing power, and not simply because of deference to authority, be it of
the state or of any other person or corporate entity.'60
159. Gardbaum, supra note 8, at 398 (footnotes omitted).
160. Thus, I side firmly with Joseph Raz in his debate with Jeremy Waldron about whether
government persuasion is improperly manipulative. Waldron writes that manipulation is
problematic for autonomy, for "it may interfere with the mental and decisional capacities that
autonomy requires. Artificial limits on powers of reasoning or imagination imposed specifically
to make a person more likely to choose a certain option make it hard to say that a choice is
indeed this person's choice rather than of the person doing the manipulating." Waldron, supra
note 2, at 1118. He acknowledges that "[t]he difficulty of course lies in deciding what is artificial
and what is not." Id. Later, he remarks, "[Ain autonomous decision may be undermined not only
by overt coercion from the outside, but also by interfering with the way people form their beliefs
about value... If it is done intentionally, it also takes on the insulting aspect of manipulation,
for it treats the agent as someone incapable of making independent moral decisions on the merits
of the case." Id. at 1145-46. Then, he adds that government shouldn't be making decisions about
the merits of various activities; these are decisions "that each person should be making." Id. at
1149. He continues:
Is it not treating people like children to make that decision for them, and then adjust the
payoffs so that they will accept it more easily. We must keep hold of one of the deepest
insights in the liberal tradition: Governments are merely composed of people who happen
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Here one must also be careful not to slip into the trap set by
Abood-writ-large."6' Recall that under such a principle, citizens have a
first amendment right not to have their tax money fund government
speech with which they disagree. Recall too that a central error of the
Abood logic is extending the general concern with government coercion
(i.e., May the government legitimately collect taxes, as a general mat-
ter?) to insist on legitimacy defenses for each instance of government
speech paid through tax dollars. Likewise, here we should not deem
coercive (or improperly manipulative) various forms of government
speech-either direct government speech that asks citizens to change
their mind about something, or government funding of private speech
to the same effect. Simply because the government has coercive power
at its disposal to collect taxes generally does not render coercive the
various instances where government hands out that money on the
condition that the recipients advance certain messages and not
others.'62
Finally, to determine whether instances exist of coercive,
rather than persuasive, government speech (outside the paradigm
case of "do X or we'll jail you"), let's look at some examples. When the
government sponsors a massive "Just Say No to Drugs" campaign, is
that coercive? It certainly asserts expertise and attempts to assert
consensus, but if people deciding whether to use drugs give such a
message heed, can we say they were coerced? Or consider Rust again.
The monopolization problems are, as I discussed above, serious." But
is there a separate problem with coercion? Assuming other sources of
information are available to the women in question, the fact that the
government's pro-childbirth message might be loud and insistent does
not render a decision to forego abortion coerced, on any normal under-
standing of the term coercion. Finally, consider the standards of
to wield extraordinary power. Therefore, when a decision is made to subsidize an
activity, one group of people is deciding a moral issue that ought essentially to be decided
by other people acting on their own.
Id. Raz's response seems to me unbeatable. Raz maintains that Waldron's argument
has a breath-taking generality. If valid it amounts to the rejection of all authority. All
authority, if it is legitimate, decides on the merits, relying on dependent reasons, that is,
ones which apply to its subjects, and takes action which changes the initial balance of
reasons in order to secure better conformity with that initial balance than was likely but
for the authority's intervention.... [I]f authoritative interventions can effect such
distortions, so, presumably, can other interventions.... Waldron's argument relies on a
notion of intrinsic merit and demerit which is independent of social conditions, and which
in most cases is hard to sustain.... [T]here is no way of saying what is the authentic,
natural, or uninterfered-with balance of costs and advantages.
Raz, supra note 17, at 1234-35.
161. See supra Part fl.C.1.
162. See WALL, supra note 2, at 200-01.
163. See supra Part III.A.1.
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decency provision at issue in Finley.'T If some artists shift their work
from indecent to decent, from dissenting to mainstream, should we say
they were coerced into doing so? Even if their only source of funds was
from the NEA, should we say that such economic pressure is tanta-
mount to coercion? This seems an improper extension of the con-
ception.
An instructive case for the coercion-persuasion line is Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan." Rhode Island established a "Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth."'" On its face, the statute gave the
Commission hortatory powers only. The police and the prosecutors
would be the ones arresting and prosecuting offenders, and their
actions could be properly challenged in court. In practice, the Com-
mission notified a magazine distributor that some of its publications
had been declared objectionable for sale to youths. The Commission
did not follow the then-reigning Supreme Court test for obscenity, nor
did it follow Court-approved procedures for review of published mate-
rial. There is no question that if the Commission had ordered seizure
of the periodicals, such an action would have been unconstitutional.
But the statute didn't grant such power to the Commission. The no-
tice to the distributor added, however, two statements that might
reasonably be understood as steps toward compulsion: it stated that
the Commission gave the police a list of the offending magazines with
"the order that they are not to be sold.., to youths," and added that
"[t]he Attorney General will act for us in case of non-compliance."67
These two statements appear to have been beyond the Commission's
statutory power, and were the basis of the Court's conclusion that the
Commission's directives were "not voluntary,"68 and that they served
as "instruments of regulation."'69  Justice Clark, concurring in the
result, agreed that the "storm was brewed from certain inept phrases
in the notices wherein the Commission assumed the prerogative of
164. See supra text accompanying notes 110-111.
165. See Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
166. Id. at 59. This was its statutory mandate:
It shall be the duty of said commission to educate the public concerning any book, picture,
pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing containing obscene, indecent or impure
language.... and to investigate and recommend the prosecution of all violations of said
sections, and it shall be the further duty of said commission to combat juvenile
delinquency and encourage morality in youth by (a) investigating situations which may
cause, be responsible for or give rise to undesirable behavior of juveniles, (b) educate the
public as to these causes and (c) recommend legislation, prosecution and/or treatment
which would ameliorate or eliminate said causes.
Id. at 60 n.1.
167. Id. at 62 n.5.
168. Id. at 68.
169. Id. at 69.
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issuing an 'order' to the police."'70 He agreed with dissenting Justice
Harlan, though, that the Commission was free to
publicize its findings as to the obscene character of any publication; to solicit the sup-
port of the public in preventing obscene publications from reaching juveniles; to furnish
its findings to publishers, distributors and retailers of such publications and to law en-
forcement officials; and, finally, to seek the aid of such officials in prosecuting offenders
of the State's obscenity laws.17 '
Given the unfortunate language in the Commission's notice to
the distributor, it is understandable that the Supreme Court held that
Rhode Island's "system of informal censorship disclosed by this
record"'1 2 violated the first amendment. But the Court's language
went further, implying that the Commission's actions would be valid
only if attempting to help distributors comply with the law, and not if
intending to otherwise affect the distribution of magazines considered
offensive, even if only as a result of the Commission's purely hortatory
acts:
In holding that the activities disclosed on this record are constitutionally proscribed,
we do not mean to suggest that private consultation between law enforcement officers
and distributors prior to the institution of a judicial proceeding can never be constitu-
tionally permissible. We ato not hold that law enforcement officers must renounce all
informal contacts with persons suspected of violating valid laws prohibiting obscenity.
Where such consultation is genuinely undertaken with the purpose of aiding the dis-
tributor to comply with such laws and avoid prosecution under them, it need not retard
the full enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms. But that is not this case. The
appellees are not law enforcement officers; they do not pretend that they are qualified
to give or that they attempt to give distributors only fair legal advice. Their conduct as
disclosed by this record shows plainly that they went far beyond advising the distribu-
tors of their legal rights and liabilities. Their operation was in fact a scheme of state
censorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions; they acted as an agency not to advise
but to suppress. 73
On the one hand, one could read this peroration as limited to
the narrow facts of the Commission's overreaching, moving from hor-
tatory powers to coercive ones. However, the Court also seemed to say
that the Commission may not act with the intent of affecting the dis-
tribution of publications, even if it made clear that its powers were
suggestive only. Justice Clark's concurrence in the result and Justice
Harlan's dissent responded to this implication, and they were correct
in maintaining that the Commission was constitutional as established,
even if it acted beyond its powers (and unconstitutionally) in practice.
The Court's suggestion that the Commission's actions would be prob-
170. Id. at 75.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 71.
173. See id. at 71-72.
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lematic if (a) intended to stop some magazines from being circulated
even if (b) clearly hortatory improperly assumes that viewpoint dis-
criminatory intent is unconstitutional even absent any viewpoint dis-
criminatory effects.' In sum, it should be considered perfectly consti-
tutional for a state to say it disapproves of certain publications and
wishes the citizens wouldn't read them. This is not a pretty use of
state power, but so long as no monopolization is occurring and dissent
is open, so long as the power is clearly hortatory and not coercive, and
so long as the government isn't seeking to mask that it is the source of
the view, then why should we not permit this expression of one, albeit
contested, notion of the good?
C. Ventriloquism
Government speech is most defensible when it does not
monopolize (i.e., it is one view among many and citizen choice is based
on full knowledge), when it does not coerce (i.e., it is merely persua-
sive), and when it is clearly identified as that of the government. This
last concern is the focus of this Section.
There are two principal concerns with governmental ventrilo-
quism. First, clear identification of speech as the government's en-
hances accountability'75 by permitting the citizens to know what posi-
tions the government has taken and to reject them, if necessary, at
election time. Imagine if all art funded by the federal government
after Finley had to be identified as government-funded, subject to a
standards of decency requirement. The public would have a much
easier time assessing the pluses and minuses of the requirement, and
holding the government accountable if necessary. The ability to iden-
tify the source of government speech or action as that of the govern-
ment was central to the Court's opinion in New York v. United
States."6 The Court invalidated a federal statute requiring states to
enact certain hazardous waste laws if they did not otherwise solve
their hazardous waste problem. The Court's primary concern was
that the federal government had "commandeered"'77 the state legisla-
tures, and commandeering was deemed improper in part because of an
accountability concern. Citizens in the affected states, reasoned the
Court, would have a difficult time determining whom to blame under
such a scheme, the federal government or their own states. It may be
174. Cf. FIss, DIVDED, supra note 7, at 99-102 (rejecting the intent inquiry). But see sources
cited supra notes 116-117.
175. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL, supra note 7, at 314; Kagan, supra note 7, at 55.
176. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
177. Id. at 175.
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that the Court oversold the accountability argument, for it would not
have been that tough to trace the ensuing state laws back to the fed-
eral mandate. But the underlying concern is the same as that in the
government speech context. In both settings, legislation that masks
the source of government speech or action is problematic.
Second, the transparent identification of speech as the govern-
ment's helps to ward off monopolization. By knowing the source of
speech, one can more readily assess its value and search for competing
speakers and viewpoints. If the source of speech is masked, there is a
risk that such value assessment and search for alternatives will be
muted, not as sharp, the tasks not as clearly defined. For example,
imagine in Rust if the regulations required signs in the public health
clinic stating 'You are now entering a government-funded facility.
The information you are about to receive has been dictated by the U.S.
government, and represents the viewpoint of the U.S. government
only...... Although such a requirement would not permit abortion
counseling or even referral, it would more clearly signal to the women
using the clinic that the speech had a particular source and (by impli-
cation) that other views are available. We can safely assume that this
would affect the decisions of some women, who would view the en-
suing advice with greater skepticism than otherwise.179
In other words, one of the problems with the standards of de-
cency requirement in Finley and the gag rule in Rust is ventriloquism.
The government advances certain messages or favored viewpoints
through buying citizens to do its dirty work. There is, however, both a
risk that the public will not see clearly enough the connection between
law and resulting speech to hold the government properly accountable
and a monopolization danger from failure to identify the source of
speech. The funding cases pose this problem in a way that "pure'
government speech cases do not." If the government puts up "Just
Say No to Drugs" billboards, the President makes a speech, or the
Senate issues a resolution, the speech in each instance is clearly that
of the government. Accountability concerns are lifted and monopoliza-
tion dangers are eased.
178. See Chervin, supra note 158, at 428. Or imagine if the doctors giving advice were
required to make a similar disclosure.
179. Redish and Kessler acknowledge the importance of transparency, but add, "[e]ven if it
were somehow feasible to require the private parties. to identify the existence of their govern-
ment funding, the risk of 'consumer confusion' of partially attentive members of the public is
very real." Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 570. They are wrong to dismiss the value of
disclosure so easily, for as discussed in the text, disclosure can help ameliorate both account-
ability and monopolization concerns.
180. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 243-34.
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Although proof of monopolization or coercion should render
government speech unconstitutional, we should view the presence or
absence of ventriloquism as a factor to be considered in evaluating
these other two concerns, and as a point of political theory, but not as
a sufficient ground on which to assess the constitutionality of govern-
ment speech. In part this is because the government can easily rem-
edy ventriloquism by disclosure; in part it is because citizens will often
know speech is dictated by the government even if no disclosure is
made; and in part it is because ventriloquism is more a concern of
political theory than of constitutional law. If it is a concern of consti-
tutional law, then it is best seen as a matter of ideal constitutional
theory (to be followed by government officials and legislators) and not
a ground for judicial invalidation of government speech. A particu-
larly deft act of masking government speech, on the other hand, may
well contribute to that speech being monopolizing or coercive, and
thus courts can still account for ventriloquism in this way.
One particularly interesting type of ventriloquism is the use of
scientific language to mask an underlying policy judgment. 8' The
earlier discussion of the possibly coercive effect of government speech
relying on expertise' 2 can be recast as a concern with this sort of
masking. The problem has arisen in the administrative law setting.
In the State Farm case, the Court invalidated the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) rescinding of passive re-
straint regulations for automobiles, primarily on the ground that the
agency had discarded prior studies without explanation.'" Justice
Rehnquist, in partial dissent, suggested that the majority had casti-
gated the agency for bumbling expertise when in fact the agency was
relying on something quite different and not scientific at all, namely,
the new deregulatory policy of the new Administration."' The distinc-
tion is an important one-if an agency is relying on expertise, then it
must open its expertise to challenge on its own terms, and the arbi-
trary and capricious test of the Administrative Procedure Act will
have bite here.'" On the other hand, if an agency is willing to come
clean and say, 'We're relying on pure policy considerations," then,
absent a clear statutory mandate to the contrary (and none was pres-
181. For an interesting discussion of science and value judgments, see LEO STRAUSS,
LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 220 (1968). See also HOLMES, supra note 19, at 197 (writing
on the distinction between assent, "agreement to empirical or mathematical truths," and consent,"assumption of responsibility in a situation where outcomes are still unknown!).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 158-160.
183. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983).
184. Id. at 58-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996).
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ent in the State Farm case), courts should defer and leave critique to
the political opposition and the citizens." That NHTSA had not
openly relied on this sort of claim means that the State Farm majority
was correct to judge the agency's expertise on its own terms, but
Justice Rehnquist's distinction is an important one to bear in mind.
Indeed, Justice Scalia has twice relied on this distinction between
agency invocation of expertise versus open agency reliance on policy. '
Because techno-talk sometimes masks underlying policy reasons,
opening agency reliance on expertise to an evaluation of such exper-
tise will, in these instances, expose the underlying policy concerns as
the true basis for the agency action, thus enhancing both account-
ability and, ultimately, rational agency decisionmaking.
There is an important connection here to the earlier discussion
of viewpoint-based speech. Recall that for many scholars, government
speech is most easily defensible if not apparently viewpoint-based, and
that this often occurs when the speech appears noncontroversial.'88
Such speech appears simply to state "the way things are," and a prime
example is, not surprisingly, scientific or technological talk. Govern-
ment has an incentive, thus, under the approach advanced by these
scholars, to mask policy decisions-and to mask what is actually entry
into a viewpoint controversy-by using language that appears scien-
tific and therefore, often, not viewpoint-based or controversial. But if
we accept a wider berth for government speech to include entry into
controversial issues, in which the government may properly and con-
stitutionally advance a contested viewpoint, then the incentive for
masking speech under the rubric of science will evaporate.
IV. THE FORum-CHANGE PROBLEM
The most difficult cases of government speech involve govern-
ment changing the. nature of a forum from open to limited. A federally
funded public health program, previously without restrictions on
doctor-patient communications, now places abortion-related conversa-
tions off limits (Rust). The national arts funding program, previously
focused on artistic merit, now refuses funding for indecent art (Finley).
Responding to these and similar cases, scholars have developed vari-
186. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
45, 865-66 (1984).
187. See generally Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998); NLRB
v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 801 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 118-132.
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ous methods of defending free speech values such as pluralism, auton-
omy, and viewpoint neutrality, while still granting government some
leeway to advance its own message. These scholars do not support, as
I do, analyzing the facts of each case to see whether government
speech vices are present. Rather, they offer a related set of explana-
tions for why government should not be permitted to change forums
from open to closed, at least in certain settings. The explanations
differ to some degree, but have a common central point, namely, that
the fact that certain forums have been understood as open is a good
and perhaps dispositive reason for them to remain open. In Section A
of this Part, I will canvas these scholarly views and contend that their
reliance on extant open-forum practice fails to grapple adequately
with the strongest evidence that such forums are no longer understood
as open.
The is-ought move in this setting-from the existence of open
forums to the normative point that it would violate principle to con-
vert them to limited forums-is not wholly without justification, how-
ever. In Section B of this Part, I will discuss the connection between
physical forums, such as streets and parks, and funding forums, such
as public health facilities or the NEA. Just as some physical forums
have attained the status of unalterably open, perhaps one could argue
that some funding forums have attained similar status. This argu-
ment, although powerful, cannot succeed. This is a remarkably com-
plex and underexplored area of first amendment law, however; my
conclusions here will, of necessity, be somewhat tentative.
A. The Scholars' Case for Keeping Open Forums Open
The government speech scholarship has focused on conditions
attached to government funding of speech. In particular, the scholars
have argued against the government's changing speech forums from
open (or relatively so) to less open, especially when done to advance a
controversial viewpoint. Although their approaches differ, the schol-
ars generally set forth tests to describe categories of speech or arenas
of speech against which' government has a heavy burden of justifying a
forum change. In seeing the forums as fixed rather than as plastic,
the scholars artificially establish a baseline of extant social practice
against which government seeking a forum change appears deviant.
But it is precisely in these cases that one should view extant social
practice as plastic rather than as fixed. If we are to challenge such
changes in the nature of the forum, it is better to do so case by case, by
asking whether monopolization, coercion, or ventriloquism is occur-
ring or is at serious risk of occurring.
2000]
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
1. David Cole
According to Cole, government must be able to speak to com-
municate and advance causes, to support speech generally to further
diversity values, and to counteract the power of private speech.'" But
government speech sometimes skews the marketplace of ideas." Case
by case analysis of the virtues and vices of government speech is too
hard to do.' 9' In its place, Cole offers the following "structural accom-
modation":9
Where neutrality is consistent with such an institution's function, strict neutrality
should be required; where some non-neutral content decisions must be made, the first
amendment should guarantee a degree of independence for the decision maker. Where,
on the other hand, the institution does not play an important role in furthering public
dialogue or individual autonomy, or where non-neutral government speech is necessary
to further an important government function or first amendment values, government
should be free to support speech non-neutrally. By requiring neutrality and independ-
ence in certain spheres of government funding and allowing departures from neutrality
in others, the first amendment can structurally accommodate the inherently contradic-
tory values and dangers of government-funded speech on an institution-by-institution
rather than case-by-case basis. 193
Most important for present purposes is Cole's reliance on fixed rather
than plastic notions of institutions. Institutions either do or do not
"play an important role in furthering public dialogue or individual
autonomy." Other institutions either do or do not "further an impor-
tant government function." Cole's spheres would, to be sure, carve up
the world between forums required to remain open and others allowed
to be limited. But the spheres are based on Cole's notion of extant so-
cial practice, without consideration of the fact that cases are hard in
this area precisely when government seeks to challenge such practice
through a forum change.
Cole discusses three main spheres in which public dialogue
reigns and in which forum changes to advance parochial, contestable
government viewpoints should be invalidated. The spheres are the
public forum, public education, and the press. I will discuss public
forums (i.e., physical ones) in Section B, below. Cole's treatment of
the press seems out of place here, since the cases he discusses
invalidated selective taxation schemes that fit more comfortably with
cases about regulation of private speech than with government speech
189. See Cole, supra note 7, at 702-03.
190. Id. at 704.
191. Id. at 715.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 716.
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cases.'9 Regarding public education, after acknowledging that content
neutrality is impossible in such a setting, Cole argues that, nonethe-
less, the first amendment "guarantees independence for those who
make day-to-day content judgments.""' By analogy, he maintains that
when funding scientific research, the government must leave room for
independent expert decisions." I have no quarrel with Cole's proposi-
tions as a policy matter. As a first amendment rule, however, the fact
that public education has been an institution (to accept Cole's descrip-
tion of it) in which individual educators have had the freedom to make
day-to-day content judgments cannot, by itself, be a reason for pre-
venting government from altering that understanding. If a small
town school board decides to experiment with providing detailed les-
son plans and lectures to its teachers, the board reflects a new social
under-standing.'97 It is odd to interpose an understanding of public
education based in the way things have been against a school board
pushing a new way.
In a separate discussion, Cole argues for treating arts funding
similarly to his three main spheres. Again, the argument is grounded
in a notion of the uncontested, the background understanding, and the
extant social practice. He writes that the arts are "central to the cul-
tural and political vitality of democratic society,"'' and that the "func-
tion of public art is not only consistent with, but is dependent upon, a
neutrality mandate."" Under this regime, artistic merit (the reigning
model) is a valid criterion, but the standards of decency provision at
issue in Finley is not." As discussed above," however, without proof
of monopolization we should not accept the idea that the first amend-
ment requires the government to maintain a fixed conception of public
arts funding.
2. Robert Post
Similarly to Cole, Post advances a conception of arenas in
which open forum rules obtain and other arenas in which various
194. See id. at 731-36.
195. Id. at 727.
196. See id. at 727-28.
197. I put to one side public choice discussions about whether and when current represen-
tatives in fact reflect a current majority of their constituents on any given issue.
198. Cole, supra note 7, at 739.
199. Id. at 740.
200. See id. at 742-43.
201. See supra Part m.A.2.
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forum limitations may be validly enacted. Post's central distinction
divides up the relevant universe into the domain of public discourse
and "managerial domains." 'Within managerial domains," he writes,
"the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends ....
Managerial domains are necessary so that a democratic state can
actually achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed
upon." In such domains, "speech is necessarily and routinely con-
strained on the basis of both its content and its viewpoint."' Post
then considers whether the gag rule in Rust involves government
forum limitation in a managerial domain.
"[T]he allocation of speech to managerial domains," he ex-
plains, "is a question of normative characterization .... [S]uch restric-
tions on speech can be justified only where those occupying the rele-
vant social space actually inhabit roles that are defined by reference to
an instrumental logic.""°  The normal understanding of the doctor-
patient relationship includes an openness of communication and an
independence of medical judgment. The Court was thus wrong in
Rust to treat the public health facility setting as a managerial domain
in which the government could permissibly draw content and view-
point restrictions."'5 Post acknowledges that the doctor-patient rela-
tionship may be altered in a particular setting. Such alteration is un-
usual, though, and the "Court offers no evidence to support its claim
that it has occurred within Title X clinics."' He further acknowledges
that the government may create special health clinics in which special
roles are clearly manifested, e.g., in which it is made clear that physi-
cians are state employees. "What the First Amendment forbids,"
though, "is the attempt to hire what all concerned understand to be
physicians and then to attempt to regulate their speech as though
they were merely employees.
208This final point is about ventriloquism. I agree with Post
that a serious problem in Rust is the absence of clear notice to the in-
digent women using public health clinics that the government has
sharply limited what the doctors may say. Of relevance to the forum-
change problem at issue in this Part is Post's reliance on the roles that
people "actually" inhabit and his assertion that there was no evidence
202. Post, supra note 4, at 164.
203. Id. at 166.
204. Id. at 171.
205. See id. at 173-74.
206. Id. at 173-74 n.127.
207. Id. at 174 n.128.
208. For further explanation, see supra Part 11I.C.
[Vol. 53:1
GOVERNMENT OF THE GOOD
that a role alteration "has occurred" in the clinics.' This language, I
believe, betrays an underlying reliance on a baseline of the
uncontested, the background, the extant social practice. What roles
we "actually" inhabit are constantly in flux, and when those roles are
shaped (at least in part) by government funding, there is no pre-
existing essential role against which role changes must be judged.
Furthermore, when government changes the nature of a forum, it
represents the desire of the current majority, and it is a contradiction
not easily resolvable to oppose such a desire with an alternative con-
ception of extant practice, for the desire is at least some evidence of
the demise of such practice.
In discussing the standards of decency provision in Finley, Post
develops a separate distinction, that of conduct rules, directed at citi-
zens, and decision rules, governing an agency's internal operation."'
NEA-supported art is clearly within public discourse rather than
within a managerial domain, states Post, but that does not mean open
forum rules must apply. Because the state is acting "in its own name,"
rather than managing a forum with neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions (or the funding equivalent), it must choose among
values."' The "grounds for distributing [government grants to private
persons] ... must be reasonable," though, "by which we mean that
they must be justifiable by reference to some common value."' De-
cency, the issue at stake in Finley, "is not a matter of partisan politics.
It is a shared value, not a preference."2 '3 Thus, Post would uphold the
standards of decency provision.
I am perplexed both by Post's standard and by its application.
The standard-requiring justification of funding conditions by refer-
ence to some common value-is either tautological (i.e., any condition
in a law will reflect a common value merely by virtue of its enactment)
or another instance of the reliance on the uncontested, the back-
ground, the extant social practice. I assume Post intends the latter,
and thus my criticism is the same as above: We cannot consistently
209. See also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 253 (1995). Post provides a similar discussion of United States Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). He states that government's assertion
of managerial authority "can only be sustained by the existence of antecedent social practices."
Post allows that government can "act in ways that alter social practices," but he insists on
sweeping forum alteration, which changes citizens' expectations of forum openness, and he
refuses to accept governmental acts that seek to change such expectations through changing the
rules on expression in that forum. See POST, supra, at 253.
210. See Post, supra note 4, at 179.
211. Id. at 184.
212. Id. at 186.
213. Id. at 187.
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demand that funding conditions reflect a pre-existing consensus on
how a forum ought to operate and simultaneously respect the some-
times parochial and controversial conceptions of the good advanced by
current legislative majorities. There might be independent reasons to
check such majorities (i.e., monopolization, coercion, and ventrilo-
quism concerns), but respect for common values as reflected in extant
social practice is not such a reason. Post's argument is another in-
stance of support for government speech when uncontested, but not
when seen as viewpoint-based. 14 As to Post's application of his stan-
dard, it seems a stretch to suggest that limiting arts funding to decent
as opposed to indecent art reflects a shared value. The thrust of plain-
tiffs' argument in the case is that in adding the standards of decency
provision, the government was taking sides with those who favor
orthodox art over those who are willing to fund non-mainstream, often
quite challenging art. The standards of decency provision-coming as
it did in the wake of the Mapplethorpe and Serrano controversies-
decisively takes sides. It does not reflect a shared value.
3. Martin Redish and Daryl Kessler
Redish and Kessler elaborate a cumbersome lexicon of cate-
gories in assessing government funding conditions on speech. They
would invalidate all "negative subsidies," i.e., money paid to shut peo-
ple up."' Positive subsidies vary. Some are "limited government em-
ployee subsidies," which are permissible, covering instances of speech
by government employees."6 The speech restrictions are consonant
with the employee's job description. "Appointment subsidies" are
similar, for appointed officials. 7
Harder are "auxiliary subsidies." These fall into three sub-
categories. "Categoricar' subsidies are "viewpoint-neutral choices to
fund particular categories, subjects, or classes of speech. 2 8 These are
permissible. "Viewpoint-based" subsidies are, however, invalid. '
Finally, subsidies of "judgmental necessity" are permitted if the origi-
nal category is viewpoint-neutral and merely categorical, and deci-
sions within such a category are "based on criteria 'substantially
related' to the predescribed goals and purposes of the program pur-
214. I have critiqued this position above in Part II.A.2.
215. See Redish & Kessler, supra note 7, at 558.
216. Id. at 565.
217. See id. at 566.
218. Id. at 567.
219. See id. at 568.
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suant to which the category of speech is funded."'  Under this
approach, Redish and Kessler argue, Rust was wrongly decided, be-
cause the initial category-barring the funds recipients from coun-
seling about abortion or referring to abortion providers-was view-
point-based and not categorical." The standards of decency provision
presents "the most difficult test for our approach," they state.'
Evaluating the provision under their judgmental necessity test, they
contend that once Congress sets an artistic excellence standard, it
may use viewpoint to judge among competing applicants, but only if
relevant to artistic excellence. 'There appears to be no basis," they
conclude, "on which a reviewing court could objectively determine that
considerations of 'decency' are inherently unrelated to the quality of
the art."' Considerations of decency, however, would be impermis-
sible if introducing "extraneous normative moral, social, and lifestyle
judgments." '
More clearly than perhaps any of the other scholars, the Redish
and Kessler approach relies on the extant social practice as a baseline
for determining the constitutionality of government funding conditions
on speech. In concluding that Rust was wrongly decided, they spend
no time on the forum-change problem, relying instead on the blanket
assertion that the gag rule was viewpoint-based and therefore invalid.
Their discussion of the Finley issue is somewhat more nuanced, but
the nuances betray the reliance on extant social practice. Viewpoint-
based decisions within a category are valid only insofar as they are
substantially related to the predescribed goals and purposes of the
program. Standards of decency could be thought to be related to artis-
tic excellence, the predescribed goal (this is debatable, but a reason-
able position). But reliance on standards of decency would be invalid
if introducing extraneous judgments. Altering a program to introduce
a new set of judgments, to re-describe rather than rely on the pre-
described, is anathema to Redish and Kessler, but it is the very stuff
of changing governments, of new judgments by new majorities. To
prevent such forum changes by adherence to current practice is clearly
to rely on a contradiction about the proper metric of extant social
practice.
220. Id. at 572.
221. See id. at 576-77.
222. Id. at 579.
223. Id. at 580.
224. Id.
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4. Mark Yudof
Yudof argues that the government should be permitted to make
content-based decisions in funding speech when the forum by its na-
ture entails selections based on content. Otherwise, we should treat
funded speech forums as open.'n He continues, in a critical paragraph:
The nature and extent of government communications ... frequently result in the
delegation of some or all editorial responsibility to a lower echelon government agency
thought to have special expertise (e.g., psychiatrists in public mental hospitals, teach-
ers in public schools, museum directors, and the editorial boards of journals). Such
delegatees are less likely to be influenced by partisan political concerns, and, in any
event, their existence makes orchestration of a uniform government communication
program more difficult, as the elements of centralization and hierarchy are absent.
Where such delegation has voluntarily taken place, courts ought to treat its ad hoc
withdrawal in order to censor particular communications as a violation of the First
Amendment. Essentially, government agencies should be held to their own institu-
tional arrangements in this sensitive area.n 6
Yudof adds, "barring a restructuring effort growing out of an effort to
censor, government agencies are free to undo their delegations. " ' As
with the other scholars, Yudof relies on a conception of extant social
practice to constrain government speech. In the case of supervising
the -speech of lower-level officials, Yudof is not contending that the
supervisors are acting ultra vires. The contention, rather, is that so
long as a delegation to make a certain type of content judgment has
been made, the delegators must abide by the judgment of their dele-
gatees until the delegation is undone. Four points are relevant here.
First, unless we are to turn agency law upside down, it is, the prin-
cipal's desire that should govern, not the agent's. We are not talking
here about countermanding the terms of an extant regulation,' but
about a principal's overruling an agent in a particular instance. Sec-
ond, although I share Yudofs ultimate concern with censorship, he
does not explain how supervention of an agent's content decision is per
se unconstitutionally censorial. Even if the principal's content deci-
sion disfavors certain viewpoints, this should not constitute a per se
first amendment violation.'s Third, although I share Yudof's concern
with decentralization, i.e., with the norm of multiple repositories of
power, the centralization of messages within an agency does not vio-
late this norm so long as dissent from the public is not blocked. Gov-
ernment speech can be one of many voices, even if the government
225. See YUDOF, supra note 19, at 240-45.
226. Id. at 243.
227. Id. at 244.
228. See generally United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
229. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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speech in some instances represents a single rather than plural view-
point from within an agency. Fourth, and reflecting the theme of this
Part, if a public school teacher chooses a book that the school board
disfavors, or if a public museum curator chooses to exhibit an artist
whose work the museum board disfavors, it is the board in each case
that reflects the current normative position of the government. To
demand that the line-level agent's content choice govern until the gen-
eral delegation is undone is to elevate extant practice (the agent's
decision) over a later-in-time normative choice (perhaps controversial
and parochial) of the government.
B. Physical Forums and Funding Forums: The Streets
and Parks Analogy
The mere fact that certain funding forums have been under-
stood as open cannot, by itself, provide an argument against govern-
ment changing the nature of such forums to limited. The scholars dis-
cussed above rely, at least in part, on the argument or observation
that certain forums have been open as a matter of practice and there-
fore that limiting such forums undercuts such practice. Cole speaks of
whether institutions do or do not play an important role in furthering
public debate; Post writes of the roles that people "actually inhabit;"'
Redish and Kessler refer to a program's predescribed goals; Yudof
would hold agencies to their subdelegations. But as I have explained,
all of these scholars improperly rely on extant practice to trump a
challenge to that practice, namely, the law in question that converts
an open forum to a limited one. There is no "natural" openness to
forums. Whether they have been open or not is a matter of practice;
certainly current legislation is at least strong evidence of the decline of
our challenge to open forum practice.
Although it is inappropriate to consider established open-forum
practice as a trump on forum limitations, an argument by analogy to
physical forums remains. For it is in that area of first amendment law
that the Court has carved out some space for rights based in practice,
and for concomitant limits on government's power to change the
nature of a forum. As the Court explained in Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, there are three types of physical
forums.' Type One includes streets and parks, the traditional public
forums, and here the government may not impose content-based rules,
but must limit its governance to time, place, and manner considera-
230. See supra text accompanying note 204.
231. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
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tions. Type Two is a forum opened for speech activity, such as a
municipal auditorium. Here, too, government may regulate for time,
place, and manner concerns only. Type Three is basically everything
else; all forums limited in one way or another to a particular purpose
are included here. Such limitations are subject to a reasonableness
test, which is generally not difficult to meet. Although the Court has
clearly limited government power in traditional public forums (and in
Type Two forums that resemble traditional public forums), and al-
though scholars accept this limitation without serious question,"' the
constitutional and theoretical source of the right to speak in streets
and parks subject to time, place, and manner regulation only has
never been fleshed out.
Two arguments seem available. The first relies on classical
common law notions of rights established through practice. As
Michael McConnell writes, custom as instantiated through the com-
mon law served as the backdrop for constitutionalism. 3 In this way,
the common law--"a collective product, a repository of many wise
men's thinking about related problems over a long stretch of time' ' -
served as a bulwark against the tyranny of the monarch. Although
the case for concretizing custom led to Parliamentary supremacy in
England, in the United States custom and its manifestation in the
common law trumped both executive and legislative power. Rights
were understood as deriving "from a source that precedes positive
law-whether from custom, from nature, or from God." '35 Thus, one
might argue that the Court has properly treated streets and parks dif-
ferently from other forums by relying on the custom of streets and
parks as open forums. The free speech right made real in these set-
tings, therefore, requires deference to that custom, as evidence of the
people's understanding of their rights over time. 6
232. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 11.
233. See generally Michael W. McConnel, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173; see also Kreimer, supra note 147, at 1359-62 (using
history as an appropriate baseline from which to evaluate claims of unconstitutional conditions).
234. McConnell, supra note 233, at 181 (quoting Charles Gray, Reason, Authority, and
Imagination: The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward, Coke, in CULTURE AND POLITIcS FROM
PURITANISM TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT 25, 31 (Perez Zagorin ed., 1980)).
235. McConnell, supra note 233, at 192.
236. Lilian BeVier suggests that "[h]istoric openness supports a right of guaranteed access"
to streets and parks 'for a number of reasons." Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum
Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 106. Historical openness makes it
hard for government to argue that speech is incompatible with a forum, thus courts don't have to
make their own incompatibility assessment, and because of this presumptive compatibility, illicit
motives might 'lie behind the effort to exclude." Id. BeVier's argument does not grapple,
though, with the hard question of how to respond to a government that desires to change the
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The second argument for the Court's insistence that the gov-
ernment treat streets and parks according to open forum rules relies
on the conception of protecting the commons. In theory, one could
view property such as streets and parks as strictly under the control of
the government. 7 But in practice, such a view could lead to extraor-
dinary limits on citizen speech, relegating citizens to private property
in order to speak in a more robust fashion. For many, this would
mean no real opportunity to influence public debate at all. 8 Thus,
insisting that streets and parks remain open forums, subject to time,
place, and manner regulation only, insures a diversity of expression,
including, importantly, the expression of those who otherwise would
have no place to speak.
The Fiss/Sunstein argument for diversity of viewpoints 9 fol-
lows here. On this argument, some forums must remain open to
ensure such diversity. One need not rely on the baseline of extant
social practice here; streets and parks could be seen as the best candi-
dates for using government-controlled property to expand speech
opportunity. In other words, we could accomplish ends similar to
nature of a previously open forum. For BeVier, historical openness is a proxy for compatibility of
speech to a forum, but the very problem in the hard cases is a current governmental decision
that the forum should be viewed a different way.
Robert Post rejects reliance on tradition in sustaining streets and parks as open forums. He
writes that streets and parks are:
part of the experience of all citizens. We ordinarily use streets and parks in a wide
variety of roles and statuses [such as traffic, parades, funerals, block parties, or festivals],
and hence we subject them to an enormous diversity of competing demands and uses. No
one of these uses has automatic priority .... It is this fact, and not a tradition of public
usage for expressive purposes, which underlies the Court's firm and correct conclusion
that streets should be seen as public forums.
POST, supra note 209, at 252-53 (footnote omitted). How is this not an argument from tradition,
though? Post points to how we "ordinarily use" streets and parks. His examples include classic
instances of expression-parades, block parties, and festivals all have significant expressive
components. Post's argument seems a blend of an argument from tradition (i.e., "this is how we
view streets and parks") and an is-ought argument (i.e., "because this is how citizens have
viewed and currently view streets and parks, their open forum status should be maintained").
Whether such arguments can provide coherent normative First Amendment principles is the
issue, though, and it isn't clear to me how Post gets from the descriptive to the normative here.
237. See generally Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
238. There is a separate but related question involving government efforts to grant some
citizens access to the property of other citizens to expand the speech opportunities of the have-
nots. For cases and discussion dealing with this issue, see generally Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1
(1986); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also Greene,
supra note 46. I do not address these cases here.
239. See generally FISS, DIVIDED, supra note 7; FISS, IRONY, supra note 7; SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY, supra note 7.
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those advocated by the scholars above, through a focus on limiting
government, without attempting to secure any particular sphere or
arena for open forum status based on its heretofore accepted charac-
teristics (which are now challenged by government). This is a fairly
attractive proposition, for the following reason: the virtues of a robust
deliberative democracy are many,"0 and without a rough measure of
speech equality, such a democratic state will be hard to attain. One
possibility, urged by Fiss and Sunstein, is to permit the government to
redistribute speech power. Suggestions include overruling Buckley v.
Valeo"1 regarding campaign financing, regulating pornography to
overcome the silencing of women, regulating hate speech to counteract
the silencing of various subjugated groups, and regulating mass media
to ensure diverse access. Apart from some mass media cases,"' the
Court has been reluctant, though, to permit legislative redistribution
of speech power. 4' This reluctance is defensible; it fits with old-fash-
ioned liberal principles regarding the public/private line, the ac-
tion/inaction line, and a "no robbing from Peter to pay Paul" principle
regarding rights (although this principle does not obtain regarding in-
come). And regardless of one's views on the matter normatively, de-
scriptively it is unlikely that the Court will soon become enamored
with legislative redistribution of speech power. Accordingly, we must
ensure a fair measure of speech equality through other means. There
are, principally, two ways to do this. One is to police rigorously the
regulation of private speech, to ensure that channels of dissent are
available. The other might be to adhere to strict open forum and anti-
viewpoint discrimination rules when government manages traditional
forums such as streets and parks.
Both of these arguments for the Court's special treatment of
streets and parks-the instantiation through custom of a right to such
forums as open, and the insurance of robust and equal speech oppor-
tunity on government property--can be extended to funding forums
that have in practice been open. Again, consider Rust and Finley. On
the argument from custom, one could make the claim that citizens
240. But see Fried, supra note 144, at 226-27 (A "wide and uninhibited discussion of political
matters" is merely an effect of liberty of expression, and not a core principle of the First
Amendment.).
241. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
242. See generally Turner Broad. Sys, 512 U.S. 622; Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. 367; see also
generally PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
243. See generally Hurley, 515 U.S. 557; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. 1; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241; see also Ameri-
can Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)
(mem.).
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have come to understand the doctor-patient relationship (Rust) and
arts funding (Finley) as unencumbered by viewpoint restrictions, and
that this understanding has concretized into a right. Here, one could
move from "is" to "ought!' with the help of a normative argument for
the "ought," and that normative argument could hearken back to the
role of custom as a bulwark of freedom.
Regarding the argument from the need to preserve robust and
equal speech opportunity, one could maintain that streets and parks
cannot suffice, that other forums must remain open as well. Without
relying on the argument from practice, one could make the case for
some forums remaining open (in addition to streets and parks) while
the government could maintain stricter controls over others. Whether
the doctor-patient forum or the arts funding forum would be the ones
chosen would remain subject to further discussion, but at least one
can see the kind of argument (based in the Fiss/Sunstein logic de-
scribed above)" ' that would be made.
Although these are strong arguments for extending open forum
treatment from streets and parks to (at least some) funding forums, in
the end I believe the arguments fail. First, the tradition of treating
streets and parks as open forums is a stronger one than any other
open forum tradition. It would come as more of a surprise to most
citizens if government limited speech in a public park to the right-to-
life side of the abortion issue than if government funded public health
clinics on those same terms. Perhaps, though, the question should be
phrased differently. Perhaps the question should be: do most citizens
expect their conversations with their doctors to be unencumbered by
content rules on what the doctors may say? Surely the answer is
"Yes," and the hard question is whether that common expectation
should be accorded the same constitutional status as the (perhaps)
parallel expectation that streets and parks are open. We are used to
limits on doctors' speech, though, based in various regulatory concerns
(regarding medication, alternative treatments, etc.). In the arts
funding setting, although some arts funding is open (i.e., based on ar-
tistic merit alone; none is really open if by open one means by lot),
much is not, but rather more limited in purpose. The argument from
the concretization of practice, thus, seems strongest with streets and
parks.
Second, the argument for allowing practice to concretize into
constitutional law, although invoked here to expand rights, is often
invoked to restrict them. For example, Justice Scalia's has insisted on
244. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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limiting rights to either what people in 1787 thoughtu or to their nar-
rowest possible articulation.246 If we are to understand custom as set-
ting constitutional norms for the purpose of keeping forums open, can
we then resist the pull for it to set constitutional norms for the pur-
pose of limiting rights elsewhere? Another concern is that for many
constitutional scholars, custom has little role to play in fleshing out
the broad, vague phrases of the Constitution.47 For these scholars, the
broad, vague phrases invite a broader interpretive practice, based
primarily in moral argument and not in custom. To invoke open fo-
rum practice, thus, would seem inconsistent with the blind eye these
scholars usually turn to considerations of custom.
It is harder to reject the Fiss/Sunstein type argument for pre-
serving open forums in the funding setting. By avoiding reliance on
practice per se, and by instead turning to the normative argument for
preserving the commons as open, this sort of argument has a logical
extension beyond streets and parks and to the other types of forums in
which many citizens speak. The principal arguments against the
Fiss/Sunstein view are these: First, it ignores the virtues of govern-
ment speech. That is, it pays no attention to the role a distinctive
government voice can play in some settings. So long as the settings
are limited (i.e., so long as they do not include all currently open fo-
rums), monopolization concerns are eased.
Second, the Fiss/Sunstein view is difficult to work out over a
set of cases. Which forums must be kept open, and which may be
limited? In the setting of physical forums, a compatibility test might
be of some assistance. Justice Kennedy has advocated replacing the
watered-down reasonableness test currently employed to assess Type
Three (limited) forums with such a test. He would require govern-
ments defending limited forums to pass a test of whether the asserted
content restriction is necessary for management of the space in ques-
tion. 8 For example, in International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, the government converted a previously open forum
245. See generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
247. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211 (1993); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995);
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975);
Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (1990).
248. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-95
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737-39
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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airline terminal to a limited one, barring literature distribution and
funds solicitation. 9 Justice Kennedy would have upheld the solicita-
tion ban and struck down the literature ban, both through application
of a compatibility test rather than through a weak reasonableness
test.y The compatibility test is somewhat different from the various
reliances on extant social practice discussed above. The compatibility
test relies less on a current norm to combat a government seeking to
alter such a norm, and more on the confidence that judges can deter-
mine what sorts of speech are inconsistent with objective properties of
physical space. There is no easy analogy to the compatibility test,
however, in the funding setting. In theory, funds could be stretched to
enormously broad horizons (e.g., fund as much art as possible) or con-
stricted quite tightly (e.g., no funding or narrow subject-matter pro-
grams such as "fund landscapes only"). There appears to be no ana-
logue to the physical contours of space that make up post offices,"l
airports, 2 etc., for judges to engage in some reasonably constrained
objective inquiry.
Finally, we do have an alternative to selecting some funding fo-
rums to remain open and then trying to figure out how to explain why
others may be limited. As I detailed in Part III, we can examine each
case for indications of monopoly, coercion, and ventriloquism. We can
go directly at the vices of some government speech, and if none exists,
then we can seek to preserve the virtues of such speech. The cate-
gorical approach advanced by the scholars discussed above improperly
concretizes practice, cannot be defended as easily as can streets and
parks by a normative argument from custom, and can serve only in a
rather scattershot way to ensure the robustness and equality virtues
of speech commons. The case by case approach focusing on the precise
vices of some government speech is the better way to proceed. 3
249. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 675-76.
250. See id. at 693.
251. See generally Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720.
252. See generally Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672.
253. In addition to the case by case approach focusing on monopolization, coercion, and
ventriloquism, we might adopt the idea that a speech condition wholly irrelevant to the nature of
the program betrays a sole desire to punish and risks excessive government leverage into
people's lives. So, although we might uphold the gag rule in Rust on the ground that it reflects
the current government's normative view about promoting childbirth over abortion in the setting
of government-funded health facilities, we would strike down a rule requiring that people not
advocate abortions as a condition of receiving food stamps, or second-class mailing privileges, etc.
See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 115; Cole, supra note 7, at 685; Redish & Kessler,
supra note 7, at 572, 579; Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 641-42. These conditions do not plausibly
advance any government message (i.e., there is a deep ventriloquism problem here). They
appear therefore much more punitive and are less defensible as an affirmative exercise of
government norm-advancement. Furthermore, the potential government leverage through such
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V. CONCLUSION
Many scholars of political theory and the American Constitu-
tion have expressed unease with government using its powers of per-
suasion to steer the citizenry in controversial directions. These schol-
ars generally support government seed money for undifferentiated
citizen speech (e.g., setting up a park amphitheater or a municipal
auditorium), and they generally support government speech pro-
moting widely accepted values (such as 'Don't Smoke"). But they
generally oppose government attempts to use its powers of persuasion
in matters of current social contest-say, abortion vs. childbirth, or
decent vs. indecent art. Such efforts, the scholars argue, violate
principles of liberal neutrality and, if clearly viewpoint based, the first
amendment.
In this Article, I have offered a different point of view. Gov-
ernment both may and should promote contested conceptions of the
good, through direct speech acts and through funding private speech
conditions is enormous. Much of the unconstitutional conditions literature focuses, properly, on
the problem of germaneness and the leverage that nongermane conditions give to government.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 197; Epstein, supra note 89, at 61; Kreimer, supra note 147,
at 1374; Schauer, supra note 144, at 994-95; see also Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1457-76 (limits
of germaneness inquiry, but revealing its relevance, as well). Likewise, the caselaw involving
the on-the-job speech rights of government employees can be seen as focusing on the germane-
ness/leverage problem. If the government's concern is truly about workplace discipline, the
government has a good shot at winning;, if the employee's speech is properly seen as on an issue
of public concern, then the employee will probably win. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
The recent dispute between New York City Mayor Rudolph Giulani and the Brooklyn
Museum turned, at least in the initial phase of litigation, on a germaneness/leveraging concern.
In response to a controversial art exhibit including a painting of the Virgin Mary made in part,
with elephant dung, the Mayor threatened to cut off the Museum's general operating subsidy
and eject it from the City-owned land and building. The general operating subsidy covers
"repairs and alterations, fuel, waste removal, wages of employees providing essential main-
tenance, custodial, security and other basic services, cleaning and general care, tools and sup-
plies, and insurance for the building, furniture and fixtures." Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sciences
v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp.2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The District Court granted the
Museum's motion for a preliminary injunction against the funds cutoff and ejectment. But the
court expressly did not rule on the City's power to refuse funding for this or any other particular
exhibit. In dicta, the court gave great leeway to the City:
[T]here is no issue presented here about the City's right to itself take positions, even
controversial ones. The Museum does not challenge the principle that government may
choose, through its funding, to espouse a viewpoint on a matter of public concern without,
as a result, being required to give equal time to an opposing view.
Id. at 201. The court then said that "the issue is not whether the City could have been required
to provide funding for the Sensation Exhibit, but whether the Museum, having been allocated a
general operating subsidy, can now be penalized with the loss of that subsidy, and ejectment
from a City-owned building, because of the perceived viewpoint of the works in the Exhibit." Id.
at 202. On that question, the court ruled for the Museum.
GOVERNMENT OF THE GOOD
with conditions attached. Liberal theory, properly understood, distin-
guishes governmental coercion from governmental persuasion. Argu-
ments to the contrary-either extending the Abood principle, offering
a Rawlsian view of political liberalism, or proposing a thin rather than
thick perfectionism-fail. Government speech has many virtues, and
those virtues do not disappear if the speech is on a matter of current
social contest. Furthermore, principles of American constitutional law
render instances of government speech invalid only if the speech
monopolizes a given speech market or coerces citizen choice. Addi-
tionally, if government ventriloquizes-i.e., if it insists on speech con-
ditions in a funding program but masks the governmental source of
the conditions-then courts should take that into account in deter-
mining whether monopolization or coercion has occurred." But apart
from these concerns, there is no constitutional deficiency with gov-
ernment speech. And this is so even if the speech is clearly viewpoint
based.
In short, government in a liberal democracy may, and should,
promote notions of the good life. It should do so even when the notions
are contested ones. It is a misunderstanding of both liberalism and
American constitutionalism to suggest otherwise.
254. Legislators and government officials should protect against ventriloquism by insisting
that government speech be transparent and not opaque as to its source.
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